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I. Introduction
Although the regulation of deceptive trade practices was at one
time primarily within the domain of the Federal Trade Commission,
such activities are now subject to scrutiny under state "Little FTC
Acts" enacted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 2 The
*Associate Professor, East Carolina University. B.A. 1973; M.P.A. 1974; M.S. 1974, Syr-
acuse University; J.D. 1981, Tulane University. Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. States developed these statutes to protect consumers.
2. ALA. CODE § 8-19-1 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1521 (1987); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1750 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2511 (1975);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 106-1201 (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 481A-I (1985); IDAHO CODE § 48-601 (1977); ILL.
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rise of Little FTC Acts as important litigation weapons in commer-
cial and consumer disputes is based largely on the relatively low
standards predicated for determining liability. In addition, Little
FTC Acts have attractive remedy provisions that may permit treble
damages.$
Prior to the enactment of these state consumer protection stat-
utes in the 1960s and 1970s, litigants pursued deceptive trade prac-
tice claims in state courts under the traditional common law fraud
theory. Due to difficulties encountered in establishing fraudulent in-
tent, many legitimate claims were not appropriately recognized and
remedied. In fact, meeting the burden of proof required by the scien-
ter element was viewed as such a significant hurdle in these cases
that it served as a litigation deterrent." In particular, individual con-
sumers generally were not equipped with the same contractual and
remedial protections accorded business persons through established
commercial law. From the consumer perspective, the expectant costs
of counsel and litigation, coupled with the uncertainty of proving in-
tent, often required acceptance of the economic reality that it was
less expensive to endure the consequences of the deceptive trade
practice than to undertake cost prohibitive legal action.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 k, para. 261-315 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-1-.5-
1 (Burns 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 774.16 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 (1983);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.110 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401 (West 1987);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 206 (1989); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.901 (_ ); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325F (West 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (Supp 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
407.010 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-101 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1601
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.360 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-Al (1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-1 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
349 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-01 (1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (West
Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-1 (Purdon
1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-24-1 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-101 (1988); TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.41 (Vernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-1 (1986); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451(a) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-196 (_); WASH. REV. CODE §
19.86.010 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101 (1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West 1988);
WYO. STAT. § 40-12-101 (1977).
3. Consumer Protection Acts that permit treble damages include the following states:
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Vermont. Additionally, the following state statutes also include a punitive
damages provision: California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, and Rhode
Island.
4. The early reliance on the doctrine of caveat emptor in the common law was primarily
responsible for this reality in commercial law litigation. For a discussion of the development of
the doctrine of caveat emptor as related to the development of state and federal regulatory
policy regarding trade practice, see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46
TULANE L. REV. 724, 726-31 (1972).
LITTLE FTC ACTS
The passage of state Little FTC Acts was in large part a re-
sponse to the deficiencies in the common law as well as the limited
reach of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).5 Courts inter-
preted the FTCA's section 56 enforcement power narrowly to encom-
pass only anti-competitive practices between businesses. This inter-
pretation eliminated any prospect that the FTCA would be broadly
construed for the benefit of consumers.7 In 1938, Congress amended
section 5 of the FTCA to bring within the purview of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) any "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . ." This significant
addition was supported by legislative history that evidenced a clear
intent that the Commission vigorously pursue questionable trade
practices that adversely affected consumers, regardless of any resul-
tant impact on competitive businesses. 9 Despite this clearly pro-con-
sumer move, however, the FTCA has never allowed a private right
of action for either consumer or business litigants. On this point the
FTCA and state Little FTC Acts differ markedly. A number of state
statutes not only provide private plaintiffs with the right to pursue a
cause of action, but also permit recovery of attorneys' fees and court
costs."1
Although the evolution of Little FTC Acts is in part attributa-
ble to the FTCA, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
5. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982) [hereinafter
FTCA].
6. As enacted in 1914, FTCA § 5 stated "that unfair methods of competition in com-
merce are hereby declared unlawful. The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce." FTCA, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
7. In FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1931), the United States Supreme Court provided
its initial interpretation of the Commission's § 5 power:
It is obvious that the word "competition" imports the existence of present or
potential competitors, and the unfair methods must be such as injuriously affect
or tend thus to affect the business of these competitors - that is to say, the trader
whose methods are assailed as unfair must have present or potential rivals in
trade whose business will be, or is likely to be, lessened or otherwise injured
Id. at 649.
8. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. I11 (1938) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
9. See 83 CONG. REC. 3256 (1938) (comments of Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938). For a comparison of Little FTC Acts with respect to attorney fees,
punitive damages, treble damages, and merchant plaintiff status, see Comment, Consumer
Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59
TULANE L. REV. 427, 441-47 (1984).
10. These states include: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,. New York,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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tion Law (UTPL)" also influenced the states' choice of specific stat-
utory language. The Committee on Suggested State Legislation of
the Council of State Governments and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion formulated the UTPL model law.'2 This model act suggested
three alternatives for defining the scope of the trade practices and
business activities to be regulated by state consumer protection acts.
One formulation was identical to the FTCA's prohibition of "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
in or affecting commerce.' 8 Another version focused on "false, mis-
leading, or deceptive acts or practices.' The third approach sug-
gested the listing of specific trade practices to be deemed unlawful.' 5
The effort to regulate trade practices within each state has been
sharply defined by the legislatures' decision to adopt one of the three
UTPL recommended statutory alternatives. Of particular interest
are those Little FTC Acts that incorporate language tracking the
FTCA's general proscription of unfair and deceptive trade practices.
Just as the federal act does not provide working definitions for what
11. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED LEGISLATION: UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAw-REVISION, reprinted in Clearinghouse No. 31,
035B.
12. For a complete discussion of the UTPL, see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 TULANE L. REV. 724, 731-34 (1972).
13. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Id. at 6.
15. The suggested prohibited trade practices include:
(1) Passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(3) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
(4) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in
connection with goods or services;
(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, charac-
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a
person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does
not have;
(6) Representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated,
altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
(7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality,
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(8) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis-
leading representation of fact;
(9) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sale them as advertised;
(10) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably ex-
pectable public demand, unless the advertisement disclosed a limitation of
quantity;
(11) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions;
(12) Engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding.
Id. at 6-7.
LITTLE FTC ACTS
will constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice, these state stat-
utes generally do not provide any guidance in answering the
question.
At the federal level, case law remedied the statute's failure to
establish a burden of proof regarding deception by adoption of the
so-called "tendency or capacity to deceive" standard. Originally rec-
ognized by the FTC and the United States Supreme Court in FTC v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 6 this standard provided that any trade prac-
tice having the tendency or capacity to deceive would be held viola-
tive of FTCA section 5.17
Commission application of this standard of proof went essen-
tially unchallenged until 1981, when President Reagan appointed
James C. Miller, III, as FTC Chairman. Miller openly advocated
statutorily defining the term deceptive but was unsuccessful in con-
vincing Congress to make such a change.18 The primary thrust of
Miller's argument was that Commission accountability and judicial
review would be enhanced:
A statutory definition will promote accountability ...because
the Commissioners decide for themselves how they want to use
their broad discretion. And when the composition of the Com-
mission changes, so too do the standards.
Moreover, a statutory definition will facilitate judicial re-
view. Courts routinely defer to the decisions of the Commission
regarding deception. This is one reason why "the Commission
has managed to prevail in the appellate courts in the overwhelm-
ing majority of its [deception] decisions that have been ap-
16. 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
17. Id. American Home Prods, Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he
Commission need not buttress its findings that an advertisement has the inherent capacity to
deceive with evidence of actual deception."); Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d
1137, 1146 n.l I (9th Cir. 1978) ("Advertisements having the capacity to deceive are deceptive
within the meaning of the FTCA. ... ); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) ("[T]he Commission was entitled to conclude from the advertisements themselves
and stipulation of fact that the ads had a tendency or capacity to mislead consumers."); Bene-
ficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977)
("[T]he likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is mea-
sured."); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir.
1968) (It is the function of the Commission to determine "[t]he meaning of advertisements or
other representations to the public, and their tendency or capacity to mislead or deceive
....") (citing Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1967) ("[The likelihood of deception or the
capacity to deceive is the criterion by which the advertising is judged."); see also Goodman v.
FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (3d
Cir. 1944); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 1 14 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682
(1940).
18. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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pealed." A statutory definition will provide guidance to the
courts by spelling out the standards upon which their review
should be based.19
Since Miller was unable to secure a statutory amendment, he
and two other commissioners authored a Deception Policy State-
ment,20 which was issued in October 1983 and subsequently ratified
in the Cliffdale Associates21 case, as the new Commission standard
for regulating deceptive trade practices. The three commissioners re-
placed the traditional tendency or capacity to deceive standard with
the definition of a deceptive act as "a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment. '2 2 There is consider-
able disagreement among commentators as to whether the Cliffdale
standard has resulted in any profound change to the federal law of
deception, with detractors noting that the new reasonable consumer
standard dilutes the Commission's previous pro-consumer position. 23
What has not been similarly reviewed and debated, however, is the
resultant impact of the Cliffdale deception standard on comparable
state regulatory policy via Little FTC Acts.
This question is particularly significant due to the indirect influ-
ence that the FTC has had in shaping policies in those states that
have general statutory provisions modeled after the federal act.
Given the volume of federal appellate and Commission case law that
19. FTC's Authority Over Deceptive Advertising: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter FTC's Deception Authority Hearings]. Chairman Miller also
discussed consumer confusion with respect to the traditional tendency or capacity to deceive
standard:
There are specific problems with the Commission's definition of deception. First,
the definition is not clear, despite its 44 year history. The courts tend to give the
Commission very wide latitude, and the Commission's own case law is not clear
and consistent. As a result, businesses do not know what they can and cannot do.
Consumers do not know what protections they do and do not have. The Commis-
sion really does not know what cases to bring and what not to bring, and the
courts do not know which Commission decisions to affirm and which to reverse.
As a result, they tend to defer to the agency.
Id. at 3.
20. In a letter to United States Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman of the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, dated October 14,
1983, Chairman Miller formally presented the Deception Policy Statement. The Deception
Policy Statement appears at 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,455 (Oct. 31, 1983); 45 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 689 (Oct. 27, 1983); and as an appendix to Cliffdale
Associates, Inc. 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984).
21. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
22. Id. at 176.
23. Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey dissented to the Deception Policy Statement
and to its application in the Cliffdale case. See Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 184. See also Bailey
& Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 849 (1984).
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had previously clarified what constituted a deceptive trade practice,
twenty-three states24 statutorily mandated that courts draw on these
interpretations in deciding deception cases. These statutory defer-
ence provisions vary widely. Some require state courts to give "con-
sideration ' 2 5 or "due consideration and great weight ' 26 to the fed-
eral standard; others mandate that state courts be "guided ' 27 by
FTC and federal court interpretations. In addition, the federal defer-
ence provisions of three Little FTC Acts provide that state court in-
terpretations and decisions should be "consistent" with federal stan-
dards.2 8 At least three states without such statutory deference
provisions have judicially noticed the federal deception standard and
have relied on it to some extent .2  Finally, of the twenty-six states
that statutorily or judicially recognize a federal deference obliga-
tion, 0 eight states also direct that state enforcement policies, rules,
and regulations be "consistent" with the federal position.3
This Article briefly reviews the development of the traditional
federal deception standard and the disputed change arguably ef-
fected by the Cliffdale case. Next, the impact of the change in fed-
eral standards on state regulatory policy is measured in accordance
with Little FTC Acts that have incorporated federal deference provi-
24. ALA. CODE § 8-19-6 (1984 & Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (1986 &
Supp. 1987); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1106
(West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §
10-1-391 (1981 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 48-604 (1977 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121 , para. 262 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207(l)
(1979 & Supp. 1987); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-103 (1983 & Supp. 1987); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN: ch. 93A: 2(b,c) (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1987); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:13 (1984 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-4 (1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(c) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-3
(1985 & Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-115'(1984 & Supp. 1987); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
17.46(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(4) (1986 & Supp. 1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) (1984 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920
(1989); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
25. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
26. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Montana, Ohio,
and Rhode Island. See supra note 24 for citations to these states' statutes.
27. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See supra
note 24.
28. These states include Georgia, Tennessee, and Utah. See supra note 24.
29. These states include Louisiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
30. See supra notes 24, 29.
31. These states include Connecticut (rules established by the Commissioner of Con-
sumer Protection), Florida (rules established by Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices), Idaho (rules established by the Attorney General), Maine (rules established by the
Attorney General), Massachusetts (rules established by the Attorney General), Montana
(rules established by the Department of Commerce), Vermont (rules established by the Attor-
ney General), and West Virginia (rules established by the Attorney General).
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sions. To this end, this Article undertakes a thorough review of state
case law to determine: (1) whether state courts have discerned or are
likely to discern any major shift in federal deception enforcement
policy as a result of the Cliffdale decision; (2) the likelihood that
these deference states will choose to follow the federal lead; and (3)
the obstacles faced by commercial enterprises given potentially con-
flicting state and federal deception regulatory policies. Appendices A
and B provide a summary of this Article in chart format.
II. Development of the Federal Deception Standard
The genesis of the Commission's traditional deception standard
can be traced to the Algoma Lumber Co.32 case decided in 1934.
Since Congress had not yet passed the Wheeler-Lea Act,33 the Su-
preme Court was asked to rule on a decision by the Federal Trade
Commission that a trade practice was anti-competitive and, there-
fore, a violation of FTCA's section 5 unfair methods of competition
provision." The Court held that the practice in question violated sec-
tion 5 because the practice had a "capacity to deceive."35 After re-
viewing the Federal Trade Commission Act and finding that Con-
gress provided no specific guidance on what would constitute an anti-
competitive trade practice, the Court's holding indirectly laid the
foundation for the yet to be recognized federal deception standard.
The future case law development of the federal deception stan-
dard was assured in 1938 when Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea
Act, thereby amending section 5 of the FTCA to prohibit deceptive
trade practices that did not necessarily impact on competing busi-
nesses. 6 This statutory amendment, which did not include a defini-
tion of deception,37 positioned the FTC to regulate trade practices
32. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
33. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
34. 291 U.S. 67, 69 (1934).
35. Id. at 81.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. The FTCA does provide a statutory definition of false advertising:
(A) (1) The term "false advertisement" means an advertisement other than la-
beling, which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether
any advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other
things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design,
device, sound, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the ad-
vertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the com-
modity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in
said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual . . ..
15 U.S.C. § 55 (1982).
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that were deemed to be unfair, deceptive, or anti-competitive with
respect to consumers as well as competing businesses. Through a se-
ries of case law decisions from 1938 to 1984, the Algoma Lumber
rule was refined and traditionally has been referred to as the "ten-
dency or capacity to deceive" test. 8
A. Tendency or Capacity to Deceive Test
The traditional federal deception standard consisted of three ba-
sic components: (1) a trade practice deemed to have a tendency or
capacity to deceive;39 (2) the potential to deceive a member or mem-
bers of the audience targeted by the trade practice; 0 and (3) a re-
quirement that the practice be material with respect to a consumer's
purchase decision. 41 The FTC applied the traditional federal decep-
tion standard by evaluating the questioned trade practice in its en-
tirety rather than "emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from
their context."4 This approach better enabled the FTC to reach con-
clusions regarding the situation created by the trade practice as a
whole, and to decide whether the practice had a tendency or capac-
ity to deceive.
A key feature of the Commission's evaluation of questionable
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); FTC v. Winsted Ho-
siery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922); American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687
(3d Cir. 1982); TransWorld Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979); Si-
meon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v.
FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Resort Car Rental Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962,
964 (9th Cir. 1975); Doherty, Clifford Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925
(6th Cir. 1968); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Good-
man v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957); Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382,
385 (7th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955); Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1944); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d
33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941).
40. The audience reaction requirement has been variously referred to as the "Substan-
tial percentage," "Substantial portion," "Substantial segment," and "Substantial numbers
test." See Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 318-20 (8th Cir. 1965) ("Substantial
percentage," "Substantial segment"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966); Exposition Press, Inc.
v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Substantial portion"); Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237
F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956) ("Substantial portion"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957);
Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688, 744 (1975) ("Substantial number"); Statement of Basis and
Purpose, Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8350 (1964) ("Sub-
stantial segment").
41. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); Raymond Lee Org., 92
F.T.C. 489, 649 (1978), affid, 679 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
81 F.T.C. 398, 451 (1972), affid, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
42. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977). See also American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. 1982);
FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
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trade practices under this standard was that the practice need only
have a potential to create deception in the minds of consumers or
business competitors. The FTC never required that a person or busi-
ness entity had been actually deceived by the challenged trade prac-
tice.4 s In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC," the Commission
stated: "Actual deception, proved by deceived consumers, is not nec-
essary: the likelihood of deception or the capacity to deceive is the
criterion by which advertising is judged." '45 By not requiring that ac-
tual deception be established, the Commission was able to protect
consumers by enjoining questionable trade practices before any indi-
vidual suffered actual harm.
In another case, business organizations charged with engaging
in deceptive trade practices raised a number of defenses, all of which
were rejected by the FTC. For example, Ford Motor Co. argued that
it had not violated section 5 because it had engaged in an advertising
campaign in good faith and any misinterpretations made by consum-
ers should not be attributable to the company."6 The Commission
disposed of this argument, stating:
The question does not depend upon the purpose of the advertise-
ment nor upon the good or bad faith of the advertiser. The point
for consideration here is whether, under the facts and circum-
stances in connection with the publication of the advertisement,
the language in and of itself, without regard to good or bad
faith, is calculated to deceive the buying public into believing it
is purchasing petitioner's cars at one price when in fact it is
purchasing them at another."
Likewise, the FTC also rejected arguments by a respondent that lia-
bility should not ensue under the traditional federal deception stan-
dard when there was no intent to deceive the consuming public. 8
The federal courts consistently upheld the Commission's rulings that
"intent to deceive is simply not an element of deception under Sec-
43. American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982) ("But the
Commission need not buttress its findings that an advertisement has the inherent capacity to
deceive with evidence of actual deception."); TransWorld Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d
212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Proof of actual deception is unnecessary to establish a violation of
Section 5.").
44. 379 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1967).
45. Id. at 670.
46. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
47. Id. at 181. See also Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Feil v.
FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953).
48. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Rule, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8325, 8350 (1964) [hereinafter Advertising and Labeling Rule].
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tion 5. '
Ambiguous trade practices that result in multiple interpreta-
tions by consumers presented a special problem under the traditional
federal deception standard. For example, advertisers argued that
when an advertisement is capable of being interpreted in both a de-
ceptive and non-deceptive fashion, there is no section 5 violation.5"
The Commission steadfastly refused to accept this argument with
respect to ambiguous trade practices. Prior to 1984, the Commission
maintained that a consumer oriented protection policy could only be
accomplished by construing ambiguities to constitute a violation of
the FTCA.51
The Commission also ruled that non-disclosure of pertinent in-
formation may constitute a section 5 violation if a consumer's
purchase decision might have been adversely affected.52 What is im-
portant in non-disclosure or omission cases is that the missing infor-
mation be deemed material and critical to a consumer's ability to
make an informed choice. In Royal Baking Powder Co v. FTC,53 the
manufacturer made substantial changes in a product's ingredients
but continued to use traditional labeling and advertising, thereby
creating the impression that the product remained unchanged.54 The
company argued that the advertisements in question presented no
false or misleading information even though most consumers would
not be able to immediately recognize that the product had been ma-
terially altered.55 The Commission used this case to develop the "de-
ceptive per se" rule. Violators were permitted to continue the ques-
tioned advertising only after complying with an affirmative
disclosure order by the Commission that required the missing infor-
mation to be included in the advertisement in order to eliminate the
49. See, e.g., Travel King, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 715, 773 (1975).
50. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
51. The FTC has wide latitude to decide whether a trade practice is potentially decep-
tive. In one instance, however, the full Commission refused to uphold an administrative law
judge's order that a company's product advertisements were ambiguous and therefore decep-
tive. The company had advertised a toothpaste's ability to remove stains from a glass plate
described as "enamel like the hard surface of your teeth." The Commission accepted the argu-
ment that the public had not been deceived since the company had never misrepresented or
disguised the fact that a glass plate was being used in the advertisements. Lever Bros. Co., 61
F.T.C. 1013, 1020 (1962).
52. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879
(9th Cir. 1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialist, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
53. 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
54. Id. at 744-45.
55. Id.
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potential or capacity for deception."8
Finally, the Commissioner considered opinion statements or ex-
aggerated representations to be non-deceptive. The FTC took the po-
sition that consumers generally can protect themselves from so called
puffing or sales talk.57 More important, though, was the FTC's insis-
tence that opinion statements be evaluated to determine whether the
statement or puff has a capacity for deception. By following this pol-
icy, the Commission refused to apply the reasonable person standard
of tort law in lieu of its interpretation of what constitutes an
exaggeration."
A second factor the Commission used in deciding whether a
trade practice violated the traditional deception standard was the re-
action of the target audience. 59 The Commission viewed the trade
practice in question from the perspective of a consumer within the
target audience, rather than considering the possible reaction of all
potential consumers.6" The Commission's rulings reflect a careful de-
cision not to establish any minimum number of consumers required
to meet this part of the test, and a recognition that consumers would
not always employ sound logic or exceptional reasoning when evalu-
ating a marketing practice.61 The Commission recognized that buy-
ers normally define words in accordance with ordinary meanings,
and formulate purchase decisions according to tae complete message
56. Id. at 753. The affirmative disclosure order requires a company to either cease the
trade practice in question or to include the missing information in future communications with
consumers. In several cases, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the
FTC to issue such an order. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957); FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13
(1946).
57. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1938).
58. See FTCs Deception Authority Hearings, supra note 19, at 11-12.
59. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
60. For example, deceptive advertising practices that target children are evaluated ac-
cording to the potential impact on that consumer group:
[lit has been recognized that minors constitute an especially vulnerable and sus-
ceptible class requiring special protection from business practices that would not
be unlawful if they only involved adults. Accordingly, a marketing practice, di-
rected in a substantial part toward minors, that interferes substantially and un-
justifiably with their freedom of buying choice is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice even if it is not especially pernicious to adults.
Advertising and Labeling Rule, supra note 46, at 8358. See also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros.,
Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1933).
61. In Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942), the court held that the Commis-
sion's deception policy should protect even "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous."
Id. at 167. The targeted audience test, which has evolved through a series of Commission and
court decisions, has been variously referred to as the "substantial portion" test, Kawajtys v.
FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); "substantial percentage" or "substantial segment"
test, Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 318-20 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
939 (1966); and the "substantial number" test, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 85 F.T.C. 688, 744
(1975).
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that is conveyed.62 The courts upheld the FTC's view of the target
audience and refused to require the agency to adopt the reasonable
person standard as the method to measure consumer reaction."
Finally, the traditional federal deception standard required that
a trade practice include a misrepresentation that was material before
the FTC would consider the practice to have a tendency or capacity
to deceive.64 This materiality requirement focused on the amount
and quality of information on which a consumer relied in making a
purchase decision.6 5 In order to conclude that the questioned practice
was material, it was not necessary for the FTC to demonstrate that a
consumer had suffered an actual injury or that there had been actual
reliance on the misrepresentation. 6
B. The FTC's 1983 Deception Policy Statement
After becoming Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission in
1981, James Miller publicly stated his preference for displacing the
traditional case law deception standard with a statutory version.
During 1982, Miller appeared before Congress on several occasions
strongly advocating that Congress amend section 5 of the FTCA.67
He characterized the Commission's deception enforcement policy as
inconsistent and ill-defined.68 Miller believed that it was improper
62. Carter Prods. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963).
63. Historically the courts have deferred to the Federal Trade Commission's judgment
relative to what types of conduct constitute a violation of the three part traditional deception
standard:
[A]s an administrative agency which deals continually with cases in the area,
the Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a
practice is "deceptive" within the meaning of the Act. This Court has frequently
stated that the Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing
courts. This admonition is especially true with respect to allegedly deceptive ad-
vertising since the finding of a § 5 violation in this field rests so heavily on infer-
ence and pragmatic judgment.
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1965).
64. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1965).
65. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165-66 (1984) ("[A] material represen-
tation, omission, act or practice involves information that is important to consumcrs and,
hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product."). See also Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391-92.
66. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
68. Regarding the wide degree of latitude granted the Commission in deception cases,
Mr. Miller stated:
Respected commentators from all portions of the political spectrum have noted
with concern the enoromous [sic] discretion entrusted to the Commission. Con-
gress has not provided clear guidance as to which cases the Commission should
bring, and which are better left alone. The courts have deferred to the Commis-
sion's presumed 'expertise', and have failed to develop clear standards for review.
The Commission itself has not clearly articulated, or consistently followed, any
set of limiting principles.
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for the Commission to hold a trade practice deceptive simply be-
cause the practice has a potential to mislead a consumer who was
not acting in a reasonable fashion."9 In 1983, after Congress refused
to define legislatively what would constitute a deceptive trade prac-
tice, Miller and the two other majority commissioners of the FTC
issued the Commission's Deception Policy Statement.70 The Com-
mission provided this Statement in response to a request by the
House Committee on Commerce that the FTC delineate its current
deception policy program. The Deception Policy Statement clearly
rejected the federal case law deception standard in favor of defining
a deceptive practice as "a representation, omission or practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circum-
stances, to the consumer's detriment."71 To support the reformulated
test, which focused on the reasonable consumer, Chairman Miller
relied on the same case law that developed the tendency or capacity
to deceive standard. Miller argued that the likely to mislead require-
ment had a historical basis, and was not contrary to the traditional
rule that actual deception was not necessary in order for the Com-
mission to bring a deception action.72
Reaction to the Deception Policy Statement was immediate. In
addition to the dissenting opinions of the two minority commission-
ers, n Congress rejected the report as biased and non-neutral.74 De-
spite the fact that Chairman Miller responded to the congressional
criticism, 75 Miller had no intention of abandoning his position as pri-
FTC's Deception Authority Hearings, supra note 19, at 13.
69. Id. at 13-14.
70. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
71. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 177 (1984) (Deception Policy Statement
appendixed to case).
72. The majority commissioners who authored the Deception Policy Statement relied
primarily on two cases to document the claim that the new standard did not abrogate the
traditional test: Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), and In re Kirchner, 63
F.T.C. 1282 (1963). See Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 181.
73. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 184 (1984) (Commisioner Pertschuk concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 189 (Commissioner Bailey concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
74. Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the House Oversight Committee, ex-
pressed criticism in a letter written to Chairman Miller:
You were directed to provide a definitive neutral analysis of a nearly 50-year old
body of consumer protection law that has served as a model for the states and
for this nation. We requested a disciplined in-depth review of what decades of
case law stand for, and of the nature and amount of evidence and deception
considered by the Commission during 50 years of litigation in the public interest.
What you delivered is a document that addresses not what the Commission's
deception jurisdiction is, but what some now at the agency want it to be.
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,455, at 56,086 (Oct. 31, 1983).
75. Id. at 56,086-89.
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mary advocate for a revised deception standard based upon reasona-
ble consumer interpretation.
C. Reasonable Consumer Test
When Congress again rejected Miller's proposal for a new de-
ception definition as set forth in the Deception Policy Statement, the
Commission chose to adopt the standard using the traditional case
law approach. Cliffdale Associates, Inc.7 1 was the first deception
case decided by the Commission after the issuance of the Statement.
In Cliffdale, the marketing strategy for a product included guaran-
tees that the product would provide automobile owners gas mileage
savings if the device was properly attached to the vehicle's engine.7 7
The complaint issued by the FTC charged that the company
lacked a reasonable basis to justify and substantiate the scientific
tests upon which the marketing claims were based 7 8 A hearing was
held before an Administrative Law Judge (AU), who ruled that
Cliffdale's advertisements constituted a deception under the tradi-
tional tendency or capacity to deceive standard.79
When the ALJ's decision was appealed to the full Commission,
a three member majority upheld the result, but reversed the part of
the decision that cited the capacity to deceive standard as the appro-
priate precedent.8" Former Chairman Miller, the author of the ma-
jority opinion, overturned the traditional standard, terming it "circu-
lar."81 He stated that in future cases the Commission would follow
the standard set forth in the Deception Policy Statement, and that a
trade act or practice would be considered deceptive if "first, there is
a representation, omission, or practice that, second is likely to mis-
lead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and
third, the representation, omission, or practice is material." 82 The
76. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
77. Id. at 163 (opinion of the Commission).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 158 (initial decision by Brown, A.L.J.).
80. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984) (opinion of the Commission).
81. Id. at 164 (opinion of the Commission). Miller also stated that the traditional fed-
eral deception standard was "inadequate to provide guidance on how the deception claim
should be analyzed." Id.
82. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984). Noticeably absent from this new
definition was the reference to consumer injury or consumer detriment. The Commission made
the consumer injury element a subpart of the materiality requirement and noted that consum-
ers "are likely to suffer injury from a material misrepresentation." Id. at 165-66. This particu-
lar aspect of the reformulated deception standard had come under especially harsh criticism,
thereby prompting Chairman Miller to decide that prudence dictated its exclusion. Id. at 188,
196-97 (Pertschuk and Bailey, Commissioners, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Miller reasonably assumed that a consumer injury component might prompt Congressman
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Cliffdale reasonable consumer standard has been cited in at least
five subsequent FTC decisions as appropriate case law precedent.8"
In each instance, the Commission reviewed and approved the appli-
cation of the new deception standard.
Vigorous dissents, registered in several of these cases, disputed
Miller's contention that Cliffdale did not effect any discernible alter-
ation in the Commission's deception enforcement policy.84 At least
one appellate court agreed with these dissenters. In Southwest Sun-
sites85 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed an FTC
deception ruling and expressly contradicted Miller's claim that the
agency's burden of proof would remain the same under the new de-
ception standard, The court stated:
Each of the three elements of the new standard challenged by
petitioner imposes a greater burden of proof on the FTC to show
a violation of Section 5. First, the FTC must show probable, not
possible, deception ("likely to mislead," not "tendency and ca-
pacity to mislead"). Second, the FTC must show potential de-
ception of "Consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances,"
not just any consumers. Third, the new standard considers as
material only deceptions that are likely to cause injury to a rea-
sonably relying consumer, whereas the old standard reached de-
ceptions that a consumer might have considered important,
whether or not there was reliance.86
Given this judicial interpretation, it is appropriate to conclude that
the federal deception standard has undergone significant change in
light of Cliffidale.
III. Adopting the Federal Standard Through Statutory Deference
With the reasonable consumer test firmly established as the fed-
eral standard for evaluating potentially deceptive trade acts or prac-
tices, the importance of this new deception standard transcends its
Dingell's Committee to take a closer look at the new case law deception standard and quite
possibly compel congressional action that would thwart the effectiveness of the Cliffdale
precedent.
83. Removatron Int'l Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,619 (FTC Nov. 9, 1988); In
re Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313 (1986); In re Southwest Sunsites, 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985),
affd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); In
re International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
84. In re Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 n.4 (1984) (opinion of the
Commission); In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1077-88 (1984) (statement
of Commissioner Bailey, concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Bailey & Pert-
schuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L REV. 849 (1984).
85. 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985), aft'd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. 785 F.2d at 1436.
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obvious impact on federal deception enforcement policy. The ques-
tion that now must be addressed is whether this revised federal de-
ception standard will indirectly affect comparable state enforcement
programs implemented by state attorneys general and state con-
sumer protection agencies.87 Presently, twenty-six states either judi-
cially or statutorily mandate that state courts look to the interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts when
determining what constitutes a deceptive trade act or practice under
the state's Little FTC Acts.88 The manner in which this question is
resolved by various state courts portends serious consequences for
resident consumers. Although former Chairman Miller is on record
as recommending that states follow the new federal deception stan-
dard,89 it is necessary to consider seriously the effect of the new stan-
dard on the underlying, consumer-oriented policy that served as the
impetus for the enactment of state consumer protection statutes.
A. Consideration
The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (IDPA) 90 includes a deference provision providing that "consid-
eration" will be given to interpretations of the federal standard in
deciding whether a trade practice violates the state statute.91 One of
the first challenges mounted against the IDPA focused on the argu-
ment that the description "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" was
overbroad and vague. Although a lower court held the statute uncon-
stitutional on this basis, the Illinois Supreme Court quickly dis-
87. In 1982, Mr. John J. Easton, Jr., then Attorney General for the State of Vermont,
provided congressional testimony critical of Chairman Miller's proposed deception standard
and the impact that it would have on state deception enforcement policy. See FTC's Deception
Authority Hearings, supra note 19, at 84-85, (statement of Mr. John J. Easton, Jr.)
88. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
89. FTC's Deception Authority Hearings, supra note 19, at 21-22. Former Chairman
Miller stated:
While I commend to the states the virtues of statutorily defining the term "de-
ceptive acts or practices," I recognize that some may disagree with my proposal
as a prescription for state regulation. The beauty of our federal system is that is
allows room for experimentation and variety, to suit the viewpoints of different
groups. In this regard, I am convinced that the statutory definition of deception
would have no significant impact upon those states that wish to adhere to prior
constructions.
Id.
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 /, para. 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
91. The IDPA deference provision provides: "In construing this section consideration
shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts
relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1h,
para. 262 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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pensed with that conclusion.92 In Scott v. Association for Childbirth
at Home, International,9" the court stated that the intent of the Illi-
nois legislature was to insure that the statute be applied broadly by
state courts.9 The court described how the FTC and federal courts
defined words and phrases contained within the federal statute in a
similar manner, and emphasized that words like deception and mis-
representation can easily be defined according to how they are un-
derstood by the general public.9" Finally, the court underscored the
importance of the IDPA deference provision by stating that the fed-
eral deceptive trade practice standard "has a venerable history of
interpretation and definition by the federal courts."96 Those courts
appropriately defined phrases that are inherently insusceptible of
precise definition, and the current state of federal trade law is "well
settled.
97
The Scott case, decided two years before Cliffdale, demon-
strates the close connection between federal law and the regulation
of deceptive trade practices in Illinois. Prior to Cliffdale, Illinois
state courts strove to adopt all aspects of the federal deception stan-
dard. For example, courts held that it is not necessary to establish
that consumers were actually deceived or confused by a questioned
trade practice.98 Illinois courts also took the position that good faith
92. Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Int'l, 88 III. 2d 279, 290-91, 430
N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (1982).
93. 88 111. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (1982).
94. Id. at 284, 430 N.E.2d at 1015. See also Hurlbert v. Cottier, 56 Ill. App. 3d 893,
895, 372 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1978).
95. 88 I11. 2d at 289, 430 N.E.2d at 1017.
96. Id. (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), and Spiegel, Inc.
v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976)). See also Hurlbert v. Cottier, 56 Ill. App. 3d 893, 895,
372 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1978) (IDPA deference provision could be extended beyond determining
the nature of prohibited acts to cover cases in which a statutory deficiency could be cured by
consulting federal law and court decisions).
97. 88 111. 2d at 289, 430 N.E.2d at 1017. See People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.
App. 3d 834, 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (IDPA terms must be defined on a case-by-case basis
because it would be futile to try to anticipate all the questionable trade practices that a fertile
mind might devise).
98. Glazewski v. AllState Ins. Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d 401, 407, 466 N.E.2d 1151, 1157
(1984); Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 219, 220, 379
N.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1978).
One lower appellate court ruling is contrary to this general policy. In Robacki v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 127 I11. App. 3d 294, 468 N.E.2d 1251 (1984), the plaintiff alleged that Allstate
fraudulently concealed information regarding coverages available under a new policy. The
court held for the defendant insurance company, stating that:
This record shows that there was no actual confusion or misunderstanding on
plaintiff's part. Also, there was no likelihood of confusion by the plaintiff and in
fact there was no deception or misunderstanding. There was no violation of the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ... , nor of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act . . . . no genuine issue of material fact is raised
so the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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and lack of intent would not constitute a proper defense under the
IDPA.9 9 More importantly, these courts took a pro-consumer posi-
tion regarding overall application of the state consumer protection
act. 100 In addition to holding that the deception standard was in-
tended to protect the "ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous"
consumer, 10 1 Illinois courts held that the statute includes deceptions
perpetrated by real estate brokers upon prospective buyers. 102 In a
number of cases, the courts held that a cause of action under the
IDPA can be substantiated despite failure to prove all the elements
of common law fraud.103
In addition to case law expressly adopting the traditional decep-
tion standard, 04 at least two Illinois courts addressed the signifi-
cance of the IDPA's federal deference provision post-Cliffdale. Most
importantly, in City of Aurora v. Green,0 5 the court recognized the
capacity to deceive test as the appropriate deception standard under
the IDPA. 06 In the 1985 case of People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stia-
nos,10 7 the Illinois attorney general sought a preliminary injunction
to prevent retailers from charging customers excessive sales tax as
Id. at 299, 468 N.E.2d at 1256 (citations omitted).
99. Warren v. LeMay, 142 III. App. 3d 550, 491 N.E.2d 464, appeal after remand, 494
N.E.2d 206 (1986); People ex rel. Fahner v. Walsh, 122 Ill. App. 3d 481, 461 N.E.2d 78
(1984); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Maclean Hunter Publishing Corp., 119 Ill. App. 3d 1049,
1055, 457 N.E.2d 480, 486 (1983); Grimes v. Adlesparger, 67 Ill. App. 3d 582, 584, 384
N.E.2d 537, 539 (1978); American Buyer's Club v. Hays, 46 III. App. 3d 270, 271, 361
N.E.2d 1383, 1384 (1977); American Buyer's Club v. Honecker, 46 III. App. 3d 252, 256, 361
N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (1977).
100. Illinois courts have recognized that the consumer fraud act is intended to provide
broader consumer protection than would be provided by an action in common law fraud and
that the act should be liberally construed in order to achieve this purpose. See generally Kel-
lerman v. Mar-Rue Realty & Builders, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 3d 300, 476 N.E.2d 1259 (1985);
People ex rel. Fahner v. American Buyers Club, Inc., 115 111. App. 3d 759, 450 N.E.2d 904
(1983); Hurlbert v. Cottier, 56 III. App. 3d 893, 372 N.E.2d 734 (1978).
101. Williams v. Bruno Applicance & Furniture Mart, 62 I11. App. 3d 219, 221, 379
N.E.2d 52, 54 (1978).
102. Beard v. Gress, 90 III. App. 3d 591, 413 N.E.2d 486 (1980).
103. Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac Div., 824 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1987); Buechin
v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 159 Ill. App. 3d 237, 244, 511 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (1987);
Buzzard v. Bolger, 117 III. App. 3d 887, 890, 453 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (1983); Duhl v. Nash
Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 494, 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (1981).
104. People ex rel. Hartigan v. MacLean Hunter Publishing Corp., 119 Ill. App. 3d
1049, 1055, 457 N.E.2d 480, 486 (1983); Harwood v. Piser Memorial Chapels, 102 Ill. App.
3d 514, 516, 430 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1981); Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, 62
Ill. App. 3d 219, 221, 379 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1978). The Illinois statute also provides a listing of
acts that constitute deceptive trade practices. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1h, para. 312 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987).
105. 126 I11. App. 3d 684, 467 N.E.2d 610 (1984).
106. Id. at 688, 467 N.E.2d at 613 ("The focus of the reviewing court's inquiry under
the [Illinois Consumer Protection Act) is the deceptive capacity of the statements at issue.").
107. 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 475 N.E.2d 1024 (1985).
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prescribed by state law.' The court held that this practice was both
unfair and deceptive as contemplated by the IDPA, and that courts
were empowered under the federal deference provision to decide
what constituted an unfair or deceptive practice on a case by case
basis. 109 The court also noted that "in determining whether a prac-
tice is unlawful or deceptive, consideration is to be given to interpre-
tations of the FTC and the federal courts under the FTCA."110 Al-
though the court only applied the criteria for what constitutes an
unfair act under federal law, it is apparent that Illinois state courts
continue to recognize the obligation to look to the FTC and federal
court interpretations when faced with a deceptive trade practice is-
sue.111 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in the future Illinois
courts will have to balance these case precedents against the question
of whether the Cliffdale deception standard should alter the manner
in which deceptive trade practice cases are handled under the IDPA.
Given the number of pro-consumer holdings, this possibility appears
to be unlikely.
B. Due Consideration and Great Weight
The consumer protection statutes of Alabama, 1 2 Alaska,"'
Florida," 4 Idaho,"15 Maryland,"' Montana," 7 Ohio," 8 and Rhode
108. See id. at 576, 475 N.E.2d at 1025.
109. See id. at 579, 475 N.E.2d at 1028. In People v. All American Aluminum & Con-
struction, 171 Ill. App. 3d 27, 524 N.E.2d 1067 (1988), the court noted the judicial obligation
to consider Federal Trade Commission decisions when evaluating unfair and deceptive trade
practices. Id. at 34, 524 N.E.2d at 1071. The All American Aluminum court, however, incor-
rectly stated that the federal standard for evaluating unfair and deceptive trade practices was
the same; the court applied the federal unfairness standard to the questioned trade practice.
Id.
110. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 579, 475 N.E.2d 1024,
1028-29 (1985).
Ill. See id. at 579, 475 N.E.2d at 1028-29.
112. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing [the Alabama Deceptive Trade
Practices Act], due consideration and great weight shall be given where applicable to interpre-
tations of the federal trade commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a)(1) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)) . ALA. CODE § 8-19-6 (1984
& Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
113. "In interpreting [the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act]
due consideration and great weight should be given the interpretations of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)
[§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act]." ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (1986 & Supp.
1987) (emphasis added).
114. "It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing [the term 'deceptive practice']
due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), as amended and in effect on April 1, 1983. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
501.204(2) (West 1972 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
115. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing this act due consideration and
great weight shall be given to the interpretation of the federal trade commission and the fed-
eral courts relating to section 5(a)(1) of the federal trade commission act. ... IDAHO CODE
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Island" 9 provide that "due consideration and great weight" be given
to Federal Trade Commission decisions and federal court interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Five of these states have
case law addressing the issue of how the federal deception policy
should affect state court decisions. 20 In addition to providing that
"due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts," '
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) 22
provides that the Department of Legal Affairs shall have the author-
ity to promulgate substantive rules to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.12  Interestingly, the Act provides that these rules "shall be
consistent with the rules, regulations, and decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provi-
sions of Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
... , "" In Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers,12 5 the plaintiff
Rogers challenged this rulemaking authority as an unconstitutional
delegation of state legislative authority.1 26 The Department of Legal
Affairs alleged that plaintiff's word puzzle game constituted an un-
lawful wager or lottery in direct violation of an administrative rule
promulgated pursuant to the Florida consumer protection statute."2
The court noted the presumption of constitutionality generally ac-
corded such a statute and concluded "that the act does not constitute
§ 48-604 (1977 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
116. "It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing the term 'Unfair or
Deceptive Trade Practices', due consideration and weight be given to the interpretations of
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts." MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1983 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).
117. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing [the term 'deceptive practice']
due consideration and weight shall be given to the interpretations of the federal trade commis-
sion and the federal courts relating to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
.... MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1987) (emphasis added).
118. "in construing ...this section, the court shall give due consideration and great
weight to Federal Trade Commission orders, trade regulation rules and guides, and the federal
court's interpretations of section 45(a)(1) of the 'Federal Trade Commission Act'. . ..."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(c) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
119. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing ... this chapter due considera-
tion and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the federal trade commission and
the federal courts relating to section 5(a) of the federal trade commission Act (15 U.S.C.
45(a)(1)) .... " R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-3 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
120. These states include Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, and Ohio. See infra notes
121-71 and accompanying text.
121. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 1988).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201-.213 (West 1988).
123. Id. § 501.205(1).
124. Id. § 501.205(2).
125. 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
126. Id. at 260.
127. Id. at 258-59.
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an unlawful delegation of legislative authority but rather . ..that
adequate standards have been announced in the Act to guide the
administrative agency and the exercise of the delegated powers con-
sistent with constitutional dictates."128 The court similarly dismissed
a related argument that the statute's federal deference provision was
vague, indefinite, and, therefore, unconstitutional." 9
To bolster its holding that the delegation of legislative authority
permitted by the Act was constitutional, the court addressed the is-
sue of whether the statute "intended to incorporate future (subse-
quent to the effective date of the statute) decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission and federal court decisions."'1 30 The court an-
swered this question by concluding that the Florida legislature in-
tended to incorporate only those federal court decisions and Federal
Trade Commission opinions issued prior to the enactment of the
FDUTPA.13' Based on the Rogers holding, it is clear that Florida
state courts will give due consideration and great weight to federal
interpretations that were in effect on April 1, 1983, the date that the
FDUTPA was implemented. Unless this statute is amended, the
traditional tendency or capacity to deceive standard will continue to
be the governing standard in Florida. 2
The Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA)1 33 provides that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce" are unlawful. "' The ACPA
defines "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" as including but not
limited to twenty-five specific practices listed in the statute.13 5 In ad-
dition to this advisory listing of deceptive trade practices, the Alaska
Act also mandates that "due consideration and great weight" be ac-
corded to FTC and federal court interpretations of the FTCA.136 In
a sweeping 1980 decision, State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 3' the
128. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d at 265. The court also recog-
nized the legislative intent that the FDUTPA state a broad public policy in order "to avoid as
much as possible the creation of loopholes by unscrupulous businesses whereby they could
circumvent the laws." Id. at 262.
129. Id. at 263.
130. Id. at 267.
131. The court stated: "To preserve the constitutional validity of the Act, we would have
to say that the legislative enactment intended only decisions made prior to its enactment." Id.
132. A subsequent decision held that if the Florida legislature wants to adopt con-
tempory federal standards, the FDUTPA may be updated yearly. See State v. Rodriguez, 365
So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. 1978).
133. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
134. Id. § 45.50.471(a).
135. Id. § 45.50.471(b).
136. Id. § 45.50.545.
137. 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980).
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Supreme Court of Alaska embraced all aspects of the traditional
federal deception standard. The court held that actual injury and
intent to deceive need not be established in order to present a prima
facie case under the deceptive practice provision. 138
The defendant in O'Neill argued that excessive weight and un-
due consideration had been accorded federal interpretations of the
FTCA and that these interpretations were not analogous to the in-
stant case because the federal act does not cover third party debt
collection.139 The Alaska Superior Court accepted these arguments,
finding that the ACPA was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
particular trade practices. 140 On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court
overturned this holding and in the process firmly entrenched the
traditional deception standard as part of Alaska state law:
[W]e find that the words of [the Alaska Act] have a "well de-
fined" meaning in the area of trade regulation and are therefore
not vague. Since the Alaska Act directs that this section be in-
terpreted by giving "great weight" and "due consideration" to
the FTC and federal court interpretations of the analogous fed-
eral statute, the words have a fixed meaning which has survived
challenges for vagueness. It is axiomatic that words will be in-
fused with the meaning of prior judicial construction. The rele-
vant prior judicial construction here is that which has emerged
from agency and judicial interpretation of the identical words
of the federal statute.
14 1
The court concluded its analysis in O'Neill by stating that "an act or
practice is deceptive or unfair if it has the capacity or tendency to
deceive."'" 2 Based upon this strong endorsement of the traditional
deception standard by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1980, the stage
is set in Alaska for a review of this policy should an appropriate
deception case arise. Such strict judicial adherence to the federal
deference provision indicates that Alaska courts are likely to be in-
138. Id. at 534-35. See also State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982)
(liberal construction).
139. State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d at 529 (Alaska 1980).
140. Id. at 530.
141. Id. at 532 (emphasis added). The court continued:
[t]he failure of the state to adopt regulations fleshing out the contours of the
Alaska Act is ... saved by the Federal Trade Commission's interpretations of
identical statutory language. This infusion of FTC law and regulations satisfies
the fundamental due process insistence "that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly."
Id. at 533 (footnote omitted) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
142. Id. at 534.
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fluenced by any significant change in the federal deception standard.
The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA)" s is similar
to the Alaska statute in that it prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices and subsequently lists a number of practices that are
deemed to be deceptive.1"4 Additional language in the Act indicates
that this listing is not intended to limit the scope of the general pro-
hibition against deceptive trade practices.' 5 Ohio courts endorsed
the legislative intent that the Act be given broad applicability and a
liberal construction. 4 6
In Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co.,"' a pre-
Cliffdale case, the Ohio Court of Appeals addressed the question of
whether the use of simulated official court documents in the debt
collection process constituted a deceptive trade practice." 8 The court
reviewed the history of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,
after which the Ohio statute had been modeled, to decide whether a
prima facie case required proof of an intent to deceive. In keeping
with the federal standard, the court concluded that "to require proof
of intent would effectively emasculate the Act and contradict its fun-
damental purpose." 19
More importantly, the Thomas case openly endorsed the tradi-
tional deception standard. Citing the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit's opinion in Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 50 the court ruled that
Sun Furniture's collection practice was a violation of the OCSPA
because "the likelihood of deception or the propensity to deceive is
the criterion by which the act or practice is judged.' 5'
This deception standard was followed subsequently in Cele-
brezze v. United Research, Inc.8 2 The court decided Celebrezze on
June 6, 1984, just three months after Cliffdale. The Celebrezze court
specifically noted the statutory deference provision in the Ohio Act
and utilized FTC and federal court case precedent in deciding that
143. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.99 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1986).
144. Id. § 1345.02(A), (B).
145. Id.; § 1345.02(B) provides a listing of ten specific trade practices deemed to be
deceptive under the Ohio statute.
146. Liggins v. May Co., 53 Ohio Misc. 21, 22, 373 N.E.2d 404, 405 (1977). See also
Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 80, 399 N.E.2d 567, 569
(1978) (intent to deceive not required to establish a violation of the Ohio Act.); Weaver v. J.C.
Penney Inc., 53 Ohio App. 2d 165, 372 N.E.2d 633 (1977) ("It is not necessary that a sale
actually take place in order for a supplier to be held liable for committing a deceptive act.").
147. 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 399 N.E.2d 567 (1978).
148. See id. at 82-83, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
149. See id. at 81, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
150. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
151. Thomas, 61 Ohio App. 2d at 81, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
152. 19 Ohio App. 3d 49, 482 N.E.2d 1260 (1984).
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the practice of filing debt collection suits in judicial districts other
than the district where the consumer resides constitutes a deceptive
trade practice. 15 3 Since the Cliffdale decision was not mentioned in
Celebrezze, Ohio continues to follow the traditional federal decep-
tion standard.
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) 154 includes a
deference provision providing for due consideration of federal inter-
pretations. 55 The Act also provides a non-exclusive list of unfair and
deceptive trade practices including any: "(1) False, disparaging, or
misleading oral or written statement, visual description, or other rep-
resentation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of
deceiving or misleading consumers; . . .(3) Failure to state a mate-
rial fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive . . . .,'" The
importance of this section is two-fold. First, the Maryland Attorney
General issued an opinion interpreting section 13-301 as a nonexclu-
sive listing of the type of trade practices that the legislature intended
to prohibit.' 57 Based on legislative history, the Attorney General con-
cluded that the Division of Consumer Protection has the authority to
define unfair and deceptive trade practices in addition to those acts
or practices expressly proscribed by this section.' 58 Second, this sec-
tion of the MCPA codified the traditional tendency or capacity to
deceive standard. As a result, when this section is read in conjunc-
tion with the broad mandate of the federal deference provision, the
Maryland statute implicitly rejects any application of the Cliffdale
reasonable consumer standard.
There is only one reported case in which Maryland courts ap-
plied the section 13-301 deception standard. In Golt v. Phillips,59 a
1986 post-Cliffdale case, tenant Golt sued landlord Phillips for viola-
tion of the MCPA based on the advertising and renting of an unli-
censed apartment dwelling. 60 Golt argued that the failure to disclose
that the dwelling was unlicensed constituted the omission of a mate-
rial fact for which he was entitled to restitutionary damages under
the statute.' 6' The court of appeals did not mention the Cliffdale
case; instead, the court relied upon several well-known federal court
153. Celebrezze, 19 Ohio App. 3d at 51, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
154. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 101-501 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
155. Id. § 105.
156. Id. § 13-301 (emphasis added).
157. 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 535 (1977).
158. Id. at 539.
159. 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986).
160. Id. at 5-6, 517 A.2d at 330.
161. See id. at 4, 517 A.2d at 331.
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decisions to support its conclusion that a deceptive trade practice
had been committed. The court stated:
[The landlord] . . .violated Section 13-301(3) of the CPA,
which states that the failure to disclose a material fact, which
deceives or tends to deceive, is an unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tice. The lack of proper licensing is a material fact that Phillips
Brothers failed to state. In addition, failure to disclose this fact
deceived Golt or at least had the tendency to deceive consumers.
An omission is considered material if any significant number of
unsophisticated consumers would attach importance to the in-
formation in determining a choice of action.62
With the adoption of the substantial numbers test'63 of the tradi-
tional federal deception standard and the reference to "unsophistica-
ted consumers,' 64 the Maryland courts reinforced the statutory lan-
guage of the CPA with judicial acknowledgement of and deference
to the traditional tendency to deceive deception standard. Conse-
quently, it is unlikely that Maryland will adopt the Cliffdale
standard.
Deception litigation under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
(ICPA) has been rather limited. Idaho courts acknowledged the
ICPA's federal deference provision' 65 and are also guided to some
extent by the statute's listing of unfair methods and practices. 66 In
State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc.,"6 7 a 1980 pre-
Cliffdale case, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the three key com-
ponents of the federal deception standard: (1) actual deception is not
required in order to bring a deception action;' 68 (2) the absence of
162. See id. at 5, 517 A.2d at 332 (citing Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC,
143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1944) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir.
1945)) (emphasis added).
163. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
164. The reference to "unsophisticated consumers" is an indication that the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act is to be applied broadly. This pro-consumer orientation can be traced
to the early development of the traditional "tendency or capacity" to deceive federal deception
standard. In Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942), the court held that the legal
standard for deception was constructed in such a way so as to protect even "the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous." Id. at 167.
165. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116
(1980); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 596 P.2d 429 (1977).
166. IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (1979).
167. 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116 (1980).
168. Id. at 453, 615 P.2d at 122. However, in Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel,
105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 (1983), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated that under IDAHO
CODE §§ 48-603 and 48-608(1), an individual bringing an action under the ICPA must suffer
some "ascertainable loss of money or property ... as a result of the use or employment by
another person of a method, act or practice" which proves to be misleading, deceptive, or false
or which is otherwise prohibited by the Act. See id. at 351-52, 670 P.2d at 56-57.
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intent to deceive is not a proper defense to a deception claim; 69 and,
(3) most importantly, an act or practice is deceptive if it possesses a
tendency or capacity to deceive consumers. 170 The court pointed out,
however, that current federal case law, "although not binding is per-
suasive in application of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.'
7'
Since no post-Cliffdale deception cases have been decided under the
ICPA, the Kidwell case indicates that Idaho courts consider federal
precedent to be advisory and nonbinding. Consequently, since the
tendency to deceive deception standard is firmly established in
Idaho, it is doubtful that Cliffdale will have any direct impact.
Finally, the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(ADTPA),'17 the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973 (MUTPA) '7 s and the Rhode Island Unfair
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (RICPA) 1 4 all pro-
vide that "due consideration and great weight" be given to interpre-
tations rendered by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts in deception cases.' 76 The Alabama and Rhode Island statutes
provide a nonexclusive listing of unlawful, deceptive trade prac-
tices.' 76 Since there has been no litigation under these three statutes
regarding the deception standard to be applied in state cases, it is
uncertain whether the Cliffdale case will have any impact on decep-
tion enforcement policy in these states.
C. Guidance
1. Mandatory Guidance.-The Little FTC Acts of Connecti-
cut, 77 Maine, 178 Massachusetts,'17 9 South Carolina, 180 Vermont,' 8'
169. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 453-54, 670 P.2d
116, 122-23 (1980).
170. Id. at 454, 670 P.2d at 123.
171. See id. at 453, 670 P.2d at 122.
172. ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1 to 8-19-15 (1984).
173. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to 30-14-224 (1989).
174. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 to 6-13.1-19 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
175. See supra notes 112, 117, 119.
176. ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-7(5) (1985 & Supp. 1989).
177. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing ... this section, the Commis-
sioner and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act ...." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110(b) (West 1987) (emphasis added).
178. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing this section, the courts will be
guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act . ME. RFV. STAT ANN. tit. 5, §
207(l) (1979 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
179. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing [this Act] courts will be guided
by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to sec-
tion 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. ... MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A: 2(b)
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Washington,182 and West Virginia183 provide that state courts be
"guided" by the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
and the federal courts. All of these states have case law addressing
the state deception standard based on mandatory guidance deference
provisions.
The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act not
only provides a guidance deference provision, but also declares that
the legislative intent is for the statute to complement the existing
body of federal law that governs unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tices. 84 The West Virginia Act also provides a nonexclusive listing
of acts or practices deemed to be unfair or deceptive per se. 185 To
promote the underlying legislative intent of the Act, the West Vir-
ginia statute also permits the state attorney general to promulgate
rules and regulations that interpret and define the statute's provi-
sions.' 86 These rules and regulations must conform "as nearly as
practicable" with comparable regulations and decisions of the FTC
and the federal courts.
87
At least one West Virginia court acknowledged the mandatory
guidance provision of the Little FTC Act. In McFoy v. Amerigas,
(West 1988) (emphasis added).
180. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing ... this section the courts will
be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts to Section 5(a)(1) .... S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp.
1987) (emphasis added).
181. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing [this Act] courts of this state
will be guided by the construction of similar terms contained in section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act as from time to time amended by the Federal Trade Commission and
the courts of the United States." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
(emphasis added).
182. The Washington statute provides as follows:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is to complement the
body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair,
deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and
foster fair and honest competition. It is the intent of the legislature that, in con-
struing this act, the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and
final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal stat-
utes dealing with the same or similar matters ....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (1989) (emphasis added).
183. The West Virginia statute provides as follows:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this article is to complement
the body of federal law governing unfair competition and unfair, deceptive and
fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and
honest competition. It is the intent of the legislature that in construing this arti-
cle, the courts be guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the
various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
184. See supra note 183.
185. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(F)(1-14) (1986 & Supp. 1987).
186. Id. § 4uA-6-103.
187. Id.
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Inc., 8 8 several customers initiated a class action against a seller of
liquid propane gas, claiming that the levy of minimum usage charges
constituted a deceptive trade practice. 8 9 The court paid particular
attention to a provision of the West Virginia statute that indicates
that by passing the Little FTC Act, the legislature did not intend to
prohibit trade practices or acts that are reasonable relative to the
"development and preservation of business or which are not injurious
to the public interest."1 0 Applying this language to the facts in
McFoy, the court concluded that there was nothing inherently de-
ceptive about imposing the levies and, therefore, the trial court's
finding of deception liability as a matter of law was incorrect.' 9' This
ruling emphasized that the section of the West Virginia statute
prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices must be read in pari
materia with the Act's public interest provision."' The McFoy deci-
sion indicates that West Virginia courts recognized the mandatory
guidance deference provision. Questions remain, however, as to the
extent of influence that the public interest provision will have on fu-
ture deception cases. At this point, the question of whether West
Virginia will adopt the Cliffdale standard remains open.
Maine is one of only a few states with case law that differenti-
ates between the standard of proof to be used in deception cases
brought by private consumers and those brought by the attorney
general. Section 213 of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
(MUTPA) permits a consumer who has purchased a good or service
primarily for personal or household use to bring a private action as
long as the consumer has suffered a loss of money or property.'
The only case that has dealt with the deception standard of
proof involved a private consumer who brought an action against a
real estate broker charging that residential acreage had been misrep-
resented in a sales transaction. 94 In Bartner v. Carter,95 the plain-
tiff consumer filed suit under the private remedies section of the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Supreme Judicial Court of
188. 295 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1982).
189. Id. at 18.
190. Id. at 20. The relevant section of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protec-
tion Act provides: "It is, however, the further intent of the legislature that this article shall not
be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development
and preservation of business or which are not injurious to the public interest. ... W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6-101(2) (1986 & Supp. 1987).
191. McFoy v. Amerigas, Inc., 295 S.E.2d at 19.
192. Id. at 17.
193. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213 (1989).
194. Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979).
195. 405 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979).
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Maine acknowledged the mandatory guidance provision of the
MUTPA and noted that the court's obligation to defer to federal
interpretations differed from cases brought by the state attorney gen-
eral.196 The Court stated that in actions brought by the attorney gen-
eral, defenses such as good faith or a lack of intent would not be
permitted given the overwhelming federal precedent. 97 Since this
case involved a private consumer, however, the court was reluctant
to impose the traditional federal deception standard based on the ab-
sence of a private right of action in the FTCA. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court reasoned that because the federal statute does not have a
private remedy, Maine courts are not required to render an "all in-
clusive application" of various interpretations of the FTCA. 98
Under section 213 of the MUTPA, a private consumer must
establish that by purchasing or leasing she suffered a "loss of money
or property" as a result of the prescribed trade practice or act.'99
The interpretation given this particular provision by the Maine court
recognized that resident consumers had been given an extremely po-
tent weapon. That weapon was capable of being used improperly for
harrassment, especially if the federal courts' rigorous application of
FTCA section 5 was available via the deference provision. 00 Accord-
ing to the court, the Maine legislature intended that the loss require-
ment of section 213 preclude a private consumer from bringing an
196. Id. at 201.
197. Id. at 200. In actions filed by the state attorney general the Maine Supreme Judi-
cial Court has adopted the federal decision that an intent to deceive is not a proper defense
under the MUTPA. See State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362, 365 (Me. 1987).
198. Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 200 (Me. 1979). The Court also carefully ana-
lyzed the remedies available under the MUTPA as compared with the federal act:
The Federal Trade Commission Act is designed primarily to protect the public,
not to punish wrongdoers or to afford direct remedies to private citizens. Its
primary purpose is to afford a preventive remedy, not a compensatory one, and
the Commission does not have to demonstrate the violation of some private right
as a basis for its remedial action. The Commission and the federal courts are
mainly concerned, in applying Section 5(a)(1), with defendants who are engaged
in continuing or repeated acts or practices deemed by the Commission to be
unlawful under that section. Because the primary purpose is to stop unfair or
deceptive practices, the chief remedy of the Commission is the cease-and-desist
order enforceable by civil penalties in the federal courts. Section 213 of the
Maine statute, on the other hand, gives the consumer-plaintiff the remedies of
'restitution' and 'such other equitable relief, including an injunction, as the
Court may deem to be necessary and proper.' Since there is no analogue in the
federal statute for the remedy by a comsumer's action and since the preventive
purpose of the Commission's action under the federal act is different from the
restitutionary purpose of individual private relief under the Maine statute, the
federal decisions afford uncertain guidance in the interpretation of the main
private remedial revisions.
Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
199. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213 (1989).
200. Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 201-02 (Me. 1979).
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action when she was unaffected by the product or service misrepre-
sentation. 10' The court concluded that an individual consumer seek-
ing redress under section 213 could not prevail by simply establish-
ing that the representations had a capacity or tendency to deceive.202
Even though the Maine court reached this conclusion, it is still
important to assess the prospect of whether the traditional federal
deception standard might be followed in cases filed by the. state at-
torney general. The Bartner court stated that Maine courts might
apply the tendency to deceive standard in such cases.203 Since Bart-
ner was a pre-Cliffdale case, and there are no other reported decep-
tion cases in Maine, it is difficult to assess the likelihood that the
reasonable consumer test will be adopted. Given the strong state-
ments made by the court in dicta regarding the then-current federal
deception enforcement policy,204 the Maine court is more likely to
take the mandatory guidance obligation literally and apply the
Cliffdale standard.
The deference provision of the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (SCUTPA)10 5 provides that state courts "will be
guided" by federal interpretations of the FTCA.20 6 State courts have
acknowledged this legislative mandate in both deceptive trade prac-
tice and unfair competition cases.207 The South Carolina Appellate
Court first recognized the traditional federal deception standard in a
February 1984 pre-Cliffdale case, State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L
Corp.208 In rejecting the defendant corporation's argument that the
SCUTPA required proof of common law fraud to establish a cause
of action, the McLeod court looked to federal policy:
Federal courts have held that unfair or deceptive acts as defined
in the FTC Act need not constitute ordinary fraud ... under the
statute there is no need to show that a claim or representation
was intended to deceive, but only that it had the capacity or
effect or tendency to deceive.209
Following the decision in McLeod, the South Carolina Appel-
201. See id. at 202.
202. Id. at 201.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to 39-5-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
206. Id. § 39-5-20(b).
207. Chuck's Feed & Seed Co., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir.
1987) (exclusive dealing contract held to be an anti-competitive practice in violation of the
SCUTPA's prohibition of unfair competition).
208. 280 S.C. 519, 525, 313 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1984).
209. Id. (emphasis added).
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late Court dealt with the deception standard issue again in Noack
Enterprises v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island,
Inc.,2"' a 1986 post-Cliffdale case. The Noack court held that for an
unfair or deceptive trade practice to be actionable under the
SCUTPA, the public interest has to be affected; the Act is not avail-
able to redress private wrongs unless this requirement is met. 11 The
court reached this conclusion after finding consistency with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's obligation to issue complaints only when
the act or practice affects commerce.21 The Noack court acknowl-
edged the mandatory guidance deference provision and drew a com-
parison between the Federal Trade Commission's ability to issue
complaints only in cases that involve commerce and the inclusion of
a similar trade or commerce provision in the SCUTPA.213 The court
felt that since "the federal act prescribes a public interest require-
ment as a condition to enforcement, our act, to comport with the
legislators intent, must be construed to contain a public interest re-
quirement also."2"" A number of subsequent decisions upheld the
public interest interpretation made by the Noack court.21 .
The holding in Noack is significant because the court carefully
traced the parallel between the SCUTPA's public interest require-
ment and the FTCA. With the traditional deception policy already
established by the McLeod case and followed by the strong deferen-
tial language of Noack, South Carolina appellate courts firmly es-
tablished the tendency to deceive standard. Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina, in Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc.,"1 held that "there is no need to show that a repre-
210. 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (1986).
211. Id. at 479, 351 S.E.2d at 350.
212. Id.
213. Id. Section 39-5-10(b) of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act provides:
"Trade" and "Commerce" should include the advertising, offering for sale, sale
or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intagible, real, per-
sonal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever
situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting
the people of this state.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court interpreted this provision to mean that a questioned trade act
or practice must affect the public interest. Noack Enters. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton
Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 479, 351 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1986).
214. Noack Enterprises, 290 S.C. at 479, 351 S.E.2d at 350.
215. Richland Wholesale Liquors v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 818 F.2d 312 (4th Cir.
1987); Blanton Enters., Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753 (D.S.C. 1988); Drs.
Steuer & Latham v. National Med. Enterprises, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987); La-
Motte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988); Barnes v. Jones
Chevrolet Co., Inc., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (1987); Key Co., Inc. d/b/a Great Games
v. Fameco Distribs., Inc., 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476 (1987).
216. 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691 (1988).
LITTLE FTC ACTS
sentation was intended to deceive but only that it had the capacity to
do so," '217 thereby expressly rejecting the Cliffdale standard.
The State of Washington has amassed an impressive list of de-
ceptive trade practice cases litigated under the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act (WCPA).21 8 In early cases, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the WCPA against claims that it was uncon-
stitutionally vague,219 and emphasized that the statute should be
given a liberal construction based upon legislative intent.220 The
court similarly rejected arguments that good faith 21 and failure to
prove an intent to deceive 22 2 should be adequate defenses in a decep-
tion case. In a number of cases, Washington courts noted the judici-
ary's responsibility to defer to federal interpretations of the
217. Id. at 242, 363 S.E.2d at 692. Accord Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 761
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1985); Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bone & Glasco Industries, Inc., 294 S.C.
494, 366 S.E.2d 26 (1988).
218. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010-.920 (1989).
219. State v. Black, 100 Wash. 2d 793, 676 P.2d 963 (1984); State v. Ralph Williams'
North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976), appeal dis-
missed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977); Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 85 Wash.
2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975); State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259,
501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
220. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984); Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); State v. Ralph Williams' North
West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430
U.S. 952 (1977); Evergreen Int'l v. American Casualty Co., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761 P.2d 964
(1988); Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 49 Wash. App. 375, 743 P.2d 832 (1987); Aubrey's R.V.
Center, Inc., v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Updegrave, 33 Wash. App. 473, 656 P.2d 1130 (1983); Keyes v. Bollinger,
31 Wash. App. 286, 640 P.2d 1077 (1982); Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 25
Wash. App. 90, 605 P.2d 1275 (1979); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash.
App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976) ("The declared purpose of the Consumer Protection
Act is to compliment [sic] the federal trade laws in order to protect the public and foster fair
and honest competition and to that end the act must be liberally construed."); Fisher v. World-
wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wash. App. 742, 551 P.2d 1398 (1976).
221. Testo, 16 Wash. App. at 51, 554 P.2d at 358; Fisher, 15 Wash. App. at 748, 551
P.2d at 1403.
222. See supra note 172. See, e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163
(1984); Bowers v. TransAmerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983);
Haner v. Quincy Farm Chems., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982); Luxon v.
Caviezel, 42 Wash. App. 261, 710 P.2d 809 (1985); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 39
Wash. App. 740; 695 P.2d 600 (1985); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771
(1982), affd and remanded, 101Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); Keyes v. Bollinger, 31
Wash. App. 286, 640 P.2d 1077 (1982); Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 25
Wash. App. 90, 605 P.2d 1275 (1979).
Washington courts have also stated that actual deception need not be proven in order to
establish a deception case. See State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977); Tallmadge v.
Aurora Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 25 Wash. App. 90, 605 P.2d 1275 (1979); Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976). Also, specific monetary
damages need not be established. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Updegrave, 33 Wash.
App. 473, 658, 656 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1983) ("The consumer need not show specific monetary
damages to recover under the Act.").
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FTCA.228 On several occasions, however, the Washington Supreme
Court stated that these interpretations provide guidance but are not
absolutely binding. 224
Since Washington courts applied the deception standard in the
context of private actions under the WCPA, 2 5 a significant line of
cases developed defining the statute's "public interest" require-
223. State v. Black, 100 Wash. 2d 793, 676 P.2d 963 (1984); Lightfoot v. MacDonald,
86 Wash. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976); Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America,
85 Wash. 2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975); State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 533 P.2d 423 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977);
State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972); State v. Burlison,
38 Wash. App. 487, 490, 685 P.2d 1115, 1117 (1984) ("The courts of this state are specifi-
cally directed to be guided by federal court interpretations of those various federal statutes
after which our Consumer Protection Act is patterned."); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile,
Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
Washington courts have similarly recognized that undefined terms in FTCA § 5 such as
"deceptive trade practice" have a meaning well settled in federal trade regulation law. See
State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d
233 (1973); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
224. The Washington Supreme Court first addressed the responsibility of state courts to
review federal precedent in 1972, and rejected the argument that the WCPA should only
incorporate federal case law precedent existing on the date that the statute was enacted. The
court held that this would be an improper conclusion since the statute does not adopt any
federal judicial precedents but simply instructs state courts to be guided by federal interpreta-
tions. The WCPA:
merely states that in construing the act the state courts are to be guided by the
interpretation given by federal courts to federal statutes dealing with similar
matters. In the final analysis, the interpretation of [the WCPA] is left to the
state courts. This enables us to arrive at the statute's meaning by the same
"gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion" used by the federal courts.
When appropriate we will consider the pertinent federal court interpretations of
Section 5 of the FTC Act. But in each case the question of what constitutes an
"unfair method of competition" or an "unfair or deceptive act or practice" under
[the Act] is for us, rather than the federal courts, to determine. Since federal
judicial interpretations are guiding but not binding, we may consider all relevant
federal precedent, including that decided after the enactment of [the WCPA].
Reader's Digest, 81 Wash. 2d at 275, 501 P.2d at 301. See also Ralph Williams', 82, Wash.
2d at 271, 510; P.2d at 238 ("[W]e are statutorily instructed to look to appropriate federal
authority for guidance... [but] are not conclusively bound by the relevant federal cases .. ")
(referring to federal cases construing the Clayton Antitrust Act); Lightfoot, 86 Wash. 2d at
336, 544 P.2d at 91 ("[11n determining the scope of the [WCPA] and the types of acts or
practices prohibited by it, this court must look to the cases which have been decided under the
federal act . . . . In directing the Court to seek guidance from those cases, the legislature
undoubtedly had in mind the fact that under the federal act the decision whether a practice or
act is one which is proscribed, rests with the Federal Trade Commission .... ") (emphasis
added); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wash. 2d 735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987); State v.
Black, 100 Wash. 2d 793, 676 P.2d 963 (1984); Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Center, 40
Wash. App. 302, 310, 698 P.2d 578, 583 (1985) ("[T]he Act mentions sources to which
Washington courts should look for guidance in construing its provisions. Among these are
federal court interpretations of federal statutes dealing with matters similar to those involved
in the Consumer Protection Act."); Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wash. App. 286, 640 P.2d 1077
(1982) (Comparing the statutory requirement of the WCPA with the federal Clayton Anti-
trust Act).
225. The WCPA was amended in 1970 to authorize a private action. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.86.080 (1989).
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ment.2 6 Recognition of this public interest requirement led to the
development of a two-part test that had to be satisfied in order for a
private action to be brought under the Act. In Lightfoot v. MacDon-
ald,227 the court held that for a private action to exist the plaintiff
would have to establish a case based on affirmative answers to the
following questions: (1) Has an act or practice prohibited by the
WCPA been committed?; and (2) Would the attorney general reach
a determination that the practice was in the public interest so as to
warrant prosecution?
22 8
Four years after Lightfoot, the Washington Supreme Court
226. See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wash. 2d 735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987);
Hangman Ridge Training v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986);
Bowers v. TransAmerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); Haner v.
Quincy Farm Chems., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 820 (1982); Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash.
2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976); Pacific Northwest Life Ins. Co. v. Turnbull, 51 Wash. App. 692,
754 P.2d 1269 (1988); Cuevas v. Montoya, 48 Wash. App. 871, 740 P.2d 858 (1987); Au-
brey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987); Luxon v.
Caviezel, 42 Wash. App. 261, 710 P.2d 809 (1985); Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Center, 40
Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578 (1985); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 39 Wash. App.
740, 695 P.2d 600 (1985); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771 (1982), affid
and remanded, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wash. App.
286, 640 P.2d 1077 (1982); Pilch v. Hendrix, 22 Wash. App. 531, 533, 591 P.2d 824, 826
(1979) ("To warrant application of the Consumer Protection Act there must be established
either a pre-sale or post-sale deceptive act or practice affecting the public interest.").
227. 86 Wash. App. 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976). Regarding the establishment of a public
interest requirement the court stated:
Since the purpose of the act is to protect the public interest, it is natural to
assume that the legislature, in granting a private remedy in [the WCPA], in-
tended to further implement the protection of that interest. It follows that an act
or practice of which a private individual may complain must be one which also
would be vulnerable to a complaint by the attorney general under the Act.
Id. at 334, 554 P.2d at 90 (emphasis added).
228. Id. The court also noted that the absence of an allowance for private actions under
the FTCA should not deter the state from recognizing such an action under the WCPA and
that the federal deference provision could be overlooked with respect to this issue:
Since the federal act has no provision for private remedies, there are no federal
cases to guide the court . . . except those cases which declare the purpose of the
act in general, that is the purpose to protect the public interest. However, we are
directed by the statute to look to "the various federal statutes dealing with the
same or similar matter" in resolving questions which arise under the state act.
The federal antitrust laws are relevant in that they also deal with problems
of business practices, regulating, as they do, monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade ....
We think the evident purpose of the legislature in providing a private rem-
edy [in the WCPA] was much the same as that which Congress expressed in
providing for treble damage actions under the antitrust laws. Its purpose was to
enlist the aid of private individuals damaged by acts or practices which were
forbidden in the acts, to assist in the enforcement of the laws. Such assistance is
desirable only if it serves the public interest and implements the purpose of the
statute.
Id. at 334-35, 544 P.2d at 90-91.
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reevaluated this private action test in Anhold v. Daniels.22 9 The
court concluded that a cause of action would lie when the questioned
conduct was unfair or deceptive, was within the sphere of trade or
commerce, and impacted the public interest.23 ° In effect, the court
rejected a literal interpretation of the language in Lightfoot that the
questioned deceptive conduct would have to be "vulnerable to a com-
plaint by the Attorney General" before it would be actionable under
WCPA.23' In its discussion, the court further developed the concept
of public interest and held that this requirement would be met when
proof was established that: (1) the defendant, by unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in conduct of trade or commerce, induced the plain-
tiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffered damage
resulting from such action or failure to act; and (3) the defendant's
deceptive acts or practices have the potential for repetition.232
The case law development of the private action test under the
WCPA has been important in facilitating the acceptance of the fed-
eral tendency or capacity to deceive standard by Washington State
courts. The traditional federal deception standard was first recog-
nized in three 1976 cases,2 3 and was slightly modified by the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals to include conduct that has a "tendency or
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public."2 This slight
reformulation of the standard is in complete accord with the pre-
Cliffdale federal deception standard and has been consistently ap-
plied in cases from 1976 to 1988.33
229. 94 Wash. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980).
230. Id. at 45, 614 P.2d at 188.
231. See id. at 45, 614 P.2d at 188.
232. Id. at 48, 614 P.2d at 188.
233. State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298,
317, 553 P.2d 423, 437 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977); Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976); Fisher v. World-
Wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wash. App. 742, 748, 551 P.2d 1398, 1403 (1976).
234. Fisher v. World-wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wash. App. 742, 748, 551 P.2d 1398,
1403 (1976).
235. See, e.g., Hangman Ridge Training v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778,
719 P.2d 531 (1986); Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1985); Bowers v.
TransAmerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); Haner v. Quincy Farm
Chems., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982); State v. Ralph Williams' North West
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S.
952 (1977); Aubrey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987);
Luxon v. Caviezel, 42 Wash. App. 261, 710 P.2d 809 (1985); Blake v. Federal Way Cycle
Center, 40 Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578 (1985); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 39
Wash. App. 740, 695 P.2d 600 (1985); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771
(1982), afd and remanded, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); Keyes v. Bollinger, 31
Wash. App. 286, 640 P.2d 1077 (1982); Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 25
Wash. App. 90, 605 P.2d 1275 (1979); Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 22 Wash. App. 143,
589 P.2d 283 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wash. 2d 548, 599 P.2d 1271 (1979); Testo
v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
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When the three-part, private action test set forth in Anhold was
substantially revised in Hangman Ridge Training v. Safeco Title In-
surance Co.,23 the Washington Supreme Court clearly signalled that
it was implicitly rejecting the Cliffdale standard. In Hangman
Ridge, the court held that a private action could be pursued when an
unfair deceptive act or practice"3 7 in the conduct of trade or com-
merce affected the public interest,238 injured a plaintiffs business or
property, and a causal link could be established between the decep-
tive practice and the injuries suffered.239
The importance of this case must be evaluated not only based
upon the open acceptance of the capacity to deceive standard, but
also upon the broad, pro-consumer language the court used in defin-
ing what constitutes the public interest requirement under the
WCPA. The Court mandated that the defendant's acts be reviewed
in order to determine whether they are part of a pattern or genera-
lized course of conduct and whether there is a substantial potential
for repetition.24 ° These factors provide persuasive evidence that the
Washington courts have also ruled that advertisements are deceptive even though they
may be literally and technically correct or if they create deception by innuendo or by double
meaning. See State v. Burlison, 38 Wash. App. 487, 685 P.2d 1115 (1984). Finally, a trade
practice is deceptive if material facts are not disclosed. Smith, 39 Wash. App. at 747, 695
P.2d at 606.
236. 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
237. The court held that a trade practice could be found to be deceptive absent an inten-
tion to deceive as long as it had a capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. The
court noted that deterring deceptive conduct before injury occurs was the primary purpose of
the capacity to deceive test. Id. at 785, 719 P.2d at 535.
238. The court broadly defined trade or commerce to include "the sale of assets or ser-
vices, and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the State of Washing-
ton." Id.
239. Id. at 793, 719 P.2d at 535-39. The court recognized that the State of Washington
was in a minority by requiring that private plaintiffs under the WCPA establish a public
interest effect but refused to alter this requirement. Id. at 788, 719 P.2d at 537. This case
constituted an outright rejection of the three-part public interest requirement put forth in
Anhold and also provided that a per se unfair or deceptive trade practice exists whenever a
statute which specifically enumerates unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce has
been violated. Hangman Ridge Training v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 789, 719
P.2d 531, 535-36 (1986). For a more complete discussion of per se violations under the
WCPA, see Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133
(1986); Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Center, 40 Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578 (1985); Smith
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 39 Wash. App. 740, 695 P.2d 600 (1985); McRae v. Bolstad, 32
Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771 (1982), affid and remanded, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496
(1984); Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wash. App. 286, 640 P.2d 1077 (1982).
240. The court stated that in consumer transactions the following factors would be eval-
uated in order to establish the public interest requirement:
I). Were the alleged acts committed in the course of defendant's business?;
2). Are the acts part of a pattern or generalized course of conduct?;
3). Were repeated acts committed prior to the act involving plaintiff?;
4). Is there a real and substantial potential for repetition of defendant's con-
duct after the act involving plaintiff?; and
5). If the act complained of involved a single transaction, were many consum-
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Washington Supreme Court intends to continue evaluating deception
cases based upon rather vigorous pro-consumer policy interpretations
of the WCPA established prior to Cliffdale.2"'
The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)242 was
enacted in 1973, and originally provided that state deceptive trade
practices would be those "determined to be" unfair or deceptive by
the Federal Trade Commission or the federal courts. 43 This defer-
ence provision was amended in 1976 to provide that Connecticut
courts would only be "guided by" federal interpretations of FTCA
section 5.2" The perceived purpose of this change was to allow Con-
necticut courts to declare certain trade practices to be unlawful even
if they had not been specifically declared to be in violation of the
FTCA by federal authorities. 4 5 Courts considered this change nec-
essary in order to effect the remedial nature of the CUTPA,24 6 and
to insure that the statute would be liberally construed and applied to
ers affected or likely to be affected by it?
Hangman Ridge Training v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 790, 719 P.2d 531, 537-
38 (1986)..The court also provided that in a private dispute the following public interest fac-
tors would be considered: "I) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of defendant's
business?; 2) Did defendant advertise to the public in general?; 3) Did defendant actively
solicit this particular plaintiff, indicating potential solicitation of others?; and 4) Did plaintiff
and defendant occupy unequal bargaining positions?" Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538. See also
McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771 (1982), aff'd and remanded, 101 Wash.
2d 161, 166, 676 P.2d 496, 500 (1984) (Regarding when a private dispute becomes a public
interest the court stated, "Evidence that others have been injured by similar deceptive repre-
sentations is sufficient to establish the potential for repetition . . . . It is the likelihood that
additional buyers will be injured in exactly the same fashion that changes a factual pattern
from a private dispute to one that affects the public interest.").
241. The Hangman Ridge case public interest and deception standards have been upheld
in an impressive string of recent cases. See, e.g., Nordstrom Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wash. 2d
735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987); Aubrey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. 2d 596, 731 P.2d
1124 (1987); Evergreen Int'l v. American Casualty Co., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761 P.2d 964
(1988); Pacific Northwest Life Ins. Co. v. Turnbull, 51 Wash. App. 642, 754 P.2d 1269
(1988); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 750 P.2d 1301 (1988); Broten v. May, 49
Wash. App. 564, 744 P.2d 1085 (1987); Cuevas v. Montoya, 48 Wash. App. 871, 740 P.2d
858 (1987); Travis v. Washington Horse Breeder's Ass'n, 47 Wash. App. 361, 734 P.2d 956
(1987); Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403 (1986).
242. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a to 42-110q (West 1987 & Supp 1989).
243. 1973 Conn. Acts 615 (Reg. Sess.), § 2(a).
244. 1976 Conn. Acts 303 (Reg. Sess.), § 1.
245. Bailey Employment Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62 (D. Conn. 1982). The
court also stated that "Itihe Connecticut statute, like the federal act, was enacted in an at-
tempt to foster honesty and full disclosure in the conduct of business. Any informa-
tion-positive or negative-that would affect a buyer's decision whether or not to purchase,
must be disclosed by the seller." Id. at 72.
246. See, e.g., Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 525
A.2d 57 (1987); Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200 Conn. 172, 510 A.2d 972 (1986);
Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 474 A.2d 780 (1984); McLaughlin
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 473 A.2d 1185 (1984); Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara
v. Indian Harbor Property, 190 Conn. 528, 461 A.2d 1369 (1983).
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deceptive trade practices. 47 Connecticut courts, however, have also
consistently acknowledged the obligation to refer to federal interpre-
tations of the FTC when deciding how unfairness and deception
standards should be established under the CUTPA 48
The case law development of Connecticut's deception standard
is somewhat unusual when compared to other states discussed previ-
ously. Although no Connecticut case decision specifically discussed
Cliffdale, Connecticut courts recognized the "likely to mislead" de-
ception standard as early as 1977. In Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten
Eighty Corp.249 WKSS radio station charged WTIC, a competing
station, with engaging in unfair competition and committing unfair
and deceptive trade practices by using the number 96 to promote its
broadcast service. 50 The Federal Communications Commission had
assigned both radio stations FM frequencies that were close to 96
megahertz. The defendant radio station argued that using the num-
ber 96 simply reflected an industry custom whereby FM stations
would round off assigned frequency designations to the nearest whole
number. 5'
The plaintiff radio station contended that the defendant's use of
the number 96 was unfair since it violated public policy, and was
deceptive because local listeners might be deceived about which sta-
tion was using this particular designation. 52 The plaintiff urged the
court to evaluate the deceptive nature of the trade practice in ques-
tion based on the federal standard, which focused on "whether the
247. See generally Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 474 A.2d 780
(1984); Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979). Connecticut courts
have also held that it is not necessary to establish an intent to deceive in order to pursue a
deception action under CUTPA. Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 35 Conn. Supp.
1, 10, 390 A.2d 949, 955 (1977) ("Subjective intent to deceive on the part of the individual or
business engaged in the challenge to practice need not be established."); see also Hinchcliffe v.
American Motors Corp., 39 Conn. Supp. 107, 120, 471 A.2d 980, 987 (1982) ("For a trade
practice to be deceptive, it must have a tendency and capacity to deceive. . .The consumer
must be deceived in his initial contact with the challenged practice . . . .CUTPA protects the
economically unsophisticated as well as the sophisticated.") (citation omitted). Connecticut
courts have also recognized a public interest requirement under the CUTPA. See Ivey, Bar-
num & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Property, 190 Conn. 528, 461 A.2d 1369 (1983). See also
Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 354, 525 A.2d 57, 63
(1987) (CUTPA intended to provide relief to persons suffering "any ascertainable loss.").
248. See supra note 213. See also Bailey Employment Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp.
62 (D. Conn. 1982); Russell, 200 Conn. at 179, 510 A.2d at 976 ("This court has repeatedly
held, in accordance with this statutory instruction, that Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
rulings and cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) serve as a lodestar for
interpretation of the open-ended language of CUTPA.") (emphasis added). Id.
249. 35 Conn. Supp. 1, 390 A.2d 949 (1978).
250. Id. at 4, 390 A.2d at 954.
251. Id. at 3, 390 A.2d at 952.
252. Id. at 8, 390 A.2d at 954.
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ignorant, unthinking and credulous person would tend to be
deceived. 253 The defendant radio station advocated adoption of a
more flexible deception standard, one that would permit a finding of
deception only when the challenged practice was "likely to deceive or
mislead a person exercising such reasonable care and observation as
the public generally is capable of exercising."' 5 1 The defendant fur-
ther urged the court to look beyond the carelessness or ignorance of
uninformed consumers in deciding whether or not a trade practice
"did, in fact, have a deceptive impact.
'255
The court held the ignorant person standard advocated by the
plaintiff to be "unrealistic," since "most trade practices, particularly
advertisements, would tend somewhat to deceive persons ignorant of
the underlying subject matter. ' 25 6 The court felt that under this
standard, most trade practices could be deemed deceptive and that
application of the standard would result in "unnecessarily severe
repercussions for trades and businesses" regulated by state consumer
protection statutes.257 The interesting aspect of this case is that the
court deferred to and adopted the federal unfairness standard, 25 8 and
also noted the tendency to deceive standard that the Federal Trade
Commission followed in deception cases. 25" Despite this acknowl-
edgement, the court chose to accept the defendant's reasonable pub-
lic standard for evaluating deceptive practices. 6
The Covenant Radio case has not been consistently applied in
other deception cases filed under the CUTPA. These subsequent de-
cisions referred to the federal tendency or capacity to deceive stan-
dard and have even contradicted the result in Covenant Radio by
stating that deception was to be measured based upon how the "un-
thinking, ignorant, and credulous" consumer would react to the
253. Id. at 10, 390 A.2d at 955 (citing Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir.
1942)).





258. Id. Connecticut courts have continued to follow the Federal Unfairness Policy with-
out making any alterations to the standard. See also Dadonna v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales,
Inc., 209 Conn. 243, 550 A.2d 1061 (1988); Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn.
747, 474 A.2d 780 (1984); Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979).
259. Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 35 Conn. Supp. 1, 10, 390 A.2d 940,
955 (1978) ("For a trade practice to be deceptive, it must have a tendency and capacity to
deceive the consumer . . . .Additionally, the consumer must be deceived in his initial contact
with the challenged practice.").
260. Id. at 11, 390 A.2d at 955.
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questioned practice.26" ' In Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp.,262
the Connecticut Superior Court further recognized that the current
standard had been characterized as unrealistic in Covenant Radio.2 3
The court seemed relatively unconcerned about this contradiction
given what the court considered to be appropriate limitations and
guidelines to be used in applying the tendency to deceive standard.2"4
The deception standard issue under the CUTPA has been fur-
ther clouded by other state court decisions holding that a trade prac-
tice would be considered deceptive if it violated public policy.265 In
effect, this latter approach to evaluating deceptive trade practices
applies the federal unfairness standard to deception cases, and has
resulted in a melding of the unfairness and deception concepts under
the Connecticut statute.266
Based on this unusual case line development, it would be impru-
261. Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 190, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (1979).
"Through the CUTPA, protection must be given to those who do not have the economic so-
phistication or the awareness possessed by others who may be less concerned about credit; the
act must be applied to protect the unthinking, the unsuspecting and the credulous as well as
the sophisticated . . . . In evaluating the tendency of advertising to deceive, . . . [the court] is
bound to protect the public in general, the unsuspecting as well as the skeptical." (emphasis
1 aded) (citing Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 926 (6th Cir.
1968)); Bailey Employment Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D. Conn. 1982) ("[l~n
evaluating that tendency or capacity, it is 'not to the most sophisticated readers but rather to
the lease' that the courts should look.") (citing Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869,
872 (2d Cir. 1961)). See also McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 473
A.2d 1185 (1984).
262. 39 Conn. Supp. 107, 471 A.2d 980 (1982). "The standard utilized by the court for
determining whether the defendant's promotion of [the product] would have a deceptive im-
pact on a consumer, is the standard applicable to an unthinking, ignorant and credulous per-
son." Id. at 120, 471 A.2d at 987.
263. Id. at 121, 471 A.2d at 987-88.
264. The court noted the following limitations and guidelines:
1) It is improper to speculate that the public will place a patently absurd inter-
pretation on an advertisement.
2) An advertiser can not be charged with liability in respect of every conceiva-
ble misconception, however outlandish, to which his representations might be
subject among the foolish or the feeble minded.
3) A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely because it
will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative seg-
ment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.
4) Prevention of the deception of the gullible and credulous as well as the cau-
tious and knowledgeable is a principle which is not to be "applied uncritically or
pushed to an absurd extreme."
Id. at 121-22, 471 A.2d at 988.
265. See, e.g., Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 525
A.2d 57 (1987); Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 474 A.2d 780 (1984).
266. See, e.g., Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342,
355, 525 A.2d 57, 64 (1987) ("[A] violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either
an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.");
Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 474 A.2d 780 (1984); Gibbs v. Mase,
II Conn. App. 289, 526 A.2d 7, 10-11 (1987); Hinchliffe v. American Motor Corp., 390
Conn. Supp. 107, 471 A.2d 980 (1982).
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dent to characterize Connecticut courts as following either the tradi-
tional deception standard or the standard advocated by the Cliffdale
case. A complete reading of the cases, however, indicates a high
threshold level of protection for consumers in deception cases. 6 '
Nevertheless, given that Connecticut recognized a standard compa-
rable to Cliffdale before any other state with a federal deference
provision, there is a solid foundation for complete acceptance of the
likely to mislead deception standard under the CUTPA.
The Massachusetts Regulation of Business Practice and Con-
sumer Protection Act (MBPA) has been the subject of consumer liti-
gation since 1974.216 In the early cases litigated under the MBPA,
Massachusetts courts noted the broad impact2 69 that the statute was
intended to have in order to provide a "proper disclosure of informa-
tion and a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to
persons conducting business activities. 2 70 The courts consistently
recognized the statute's federal deference provision 271 and were
quick to adopt several subparts of the federal deception standard.
Massachusetts courts held that knowledge of falsity,272 actual reli-
ance, 27  and intention to deceive 7 " are not critical elements in an
267. The CUTPA has been held to apply to attorneys, Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic
of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983), and the insurance industry,
Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986).
268. In Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974), the first
case decided under the MBPA, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the
statute "created new substantive rights by making conduct unlawful which was not unlawful
under the common law for any prior statute." Id. at -, 316 N.E.2d at 755. See also Heller
v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978).
269. Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 380 Mass. 762 _. 407 N.E.2d 297,
301 (1980); Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, -, 382 N.E.2d 1065,
1069 (1978); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc. 366 Mass. 688, -, 322 N.E.2d 768, 772
(1975).
270. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, -, 316 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1974).
271. Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. ComputerWorld, 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185
(1986); Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307, 446 N.E.2d 674 (1983); Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attor-
ney General, 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d 297 (1980); Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v.
Killeen, 377 Mass. 100, 384 N.E.2d 1231 (1979); Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 377
Mass. 37, -, 385 N.E.2d 240, 249 (1979); Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass.
621, , 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 (1978); Schubach v. Household Finance Corp., 376 N.E.2d
140, 141 (Mass. 1978) (Relying on Federal Trade Commission decisions the court held that
the filing of law suits by collection agencies in such a way so as to precipitate default judge-
ments violated the MBPA.); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, -, 322 N.E.2d
768, 773 (1975).
272. Massachusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1980); Slaney v. Westwood Auto,
Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975).
273. See supra note 272, see also International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass.
841, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983); Fraser Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Desmond, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 524
N.E.2d 110 (1988). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, held in one case
that a plaintiff must demonstrate "causal connection between the deception and the loss and
that the loss was foreseeable as a result of the deception." International Fidelity, 387 Mass. at
-, 443 N.E.2d at 1314.
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action filed under the MBPA.
Massachusetts courts first explained the importance of the
FTCA's impact upon the MBPA in Slaney v. Westwood Auto,
Inc. 75 This acknowledgement of the federal statute was soon fol-
lowed by adoption of the federal unfairness standard as applied to
cases under the MBPA.2 76 With regard to defining "deceptive" trade
practices under the MBPA, however, Massachusetts did not adopt a
verbatim recitation of the tendency to deceive standard.
In Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General,z77 the Massachusetts
Attorney General filed a complaint alleging that privately owned
utility companies had committed unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tices by allocating short-term debt interest expense to inventory cost
of gas charged to consumers .2 7  The court held that a trade practice
is deceptive "if it could reasonably be found to have caused a person
to act differently from the way he otherwise would have acted. 2 79
The Lowell deception standard has been upheld consistently in
cases extending from 1979 through 1988.80 The Cliffdale deception
standard has not been mentioned in these subsequent deception
cases, and a close reading of the opinions reveals that Massachusetts
courts view the Lowell deception standard as setting a high threshold
level of protection for consumers.
For example, in Purity Supreme Inc. v. Attorney General,28 a
regulation promulgated by the state attorney general pursuant to the
MBPA was challenged as being more restrictive than comparable
274. See generally Fraser Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Desmond, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 524
N.E.2d 110 (1988) and Giannasca v. Everett Aluminum, Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 431
N.E.2d 596 (1982).
275. 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975). "For purposes of uniformity and certainty
of construction, Massachusetts along with a few other states, has thus wholly incorporated the
[FTCA] into its statute." Id. at 694 n.8, 322 N.E.2d at 773 n.8.
276. See generally Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. ComputerWorld, 396 Mass. 760, 489
N.E.2d 185 (1986); Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d
297 (1980); PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915
(1975); Wasserman v. Agnastopoulos, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 497 N.E.2d 19 (1986); N.J.
Genderon Lumber v. Great Northern Homes, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 395 N.E.2d 457 (1979).
277. 377 Mass. 37, 385 N.E.2d 240 (1979).
278. Id. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 242.
279. Id. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 249; see also Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass.
604, -, 459 N.E.2d 80, 87 (1983) ("Courts have deliberately avoided setting down a clear
definition of conduct constituting a [deceptive trade practice].").
280. See generally Rizzuto v. Joy Mfg. Co., 834 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1987); Kazmaier v.
Wooten, 761 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1985); Puretest Ice Cream, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 614 F. Supp.
994 (D. Mass. 1985); Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d
297 (1980); Fraser Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Desmond, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 524 N.E.2d 110
(1988); Grossman v. Waltham Chem. Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 932, 436 N.E.2d 1243 (1982);
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 407 N.E.2d 352 (1980).
281. 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d 297 (1980).
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Federal Trade Commission practices concerning the same type of ac-
tivities.282 The court held that the only limitation on the Massachu-
setts Attorney General's power to interpret the MBPA was that defi-
nitions not be inconsistent with the FTC and federal court
decisions.2 "3 The court also noted that Massachusetts was not forbid-
den to adopt rules and regulations that were more restrictive than
those provided by the Federal Trade Commission despite the
MBPA's federal deference provision.28 '
The Purity Supreme holding indicates that Massachusetts
courts would view any deception definition as inconsistent with FTC
decisions if it is less restrictive than the federal definition. Should
Massachusetts courts continue to follow this rule of interpretation,
and there is every reason to expect that they will, it is very doubtful
that Cliffdale will have significant impact on future deception cases
litigated under the Massachusetts Business Practice Act.285 The line
of MBPA deception cases indicates that Massachusetts courts will
defer to federal interpretations only when those decisions offer in-
creased consumer protection as compared to that afforded by the
Massachusetts Little FTC Act.
Finally, Vermont is the only state that has directly addressed
the impact of the Cliffidale deception standard under the state's Lit-
tle FTC Act. In Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 86 a purchaser filed
an action under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA)287
against a dealer/manufacturer of limited edition automobiles. 88 In
analyzing the alleged misrepresentations made by the dealer, the
Vermont court noted that a significant number of federal courts rec-
ognized that a practice was deceptive if it had a tendency or capac-
ity to deceive.28 9 The court, however, quoted excerpts from the Inter-
282. Id. at __, 407 N.E.2d at 306.
283. Id. at , 407 N.E.2d at 304. The court stated that "the Massachusetts statute
thus incorporates the extensive body of Federal administrative and decisional law under the
FTC Act . . . insofar as it relates to definitions of 'unfair' and 'deceptive.' " Id. at -, 407
N.E.2d at 301.
284. Id. at - , 407 N.E.2d at 309.
285. Massachusetts courts have also held that failure to disclose a material fact consti-
tutes deception under the MBPA. See Grossman v. Waltham Chem. Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct.
932, 436 N.E.2d 1243 (1982); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 407 N.E.2d 352
(1980). Another court has held "that a negligent misrepresentation of fact the truth of which
is reasonably capable of ascertainment is an unfair and deceptive act or practice within the
meaning of [MBPA]." Glickman v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 229, 486 N.E.2d 737, 741
(1985).
286. 147 Vt. 120, 513 A.2d 1168 (1986).
287. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2462 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
288. Poulin, 147 Vt. at -., 513 A.2d at 1170.
289. Id. at __, 513 A.2d at 1171.
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national Harvester29" case that detailed the critical elements of the
likely to mislead deception standard. 91 The court concluded by stat-
ing that "it is unnecessary to determine which standard should be
adopted for purposes of this case under our Act, because in light of
the facts presented here, both standards are satisfied." '92
In a subsequent 1988 case, State v. Stedman,293 the Vermont
Supreme Court similarly cited both the traditional deception stan-
dard and the Cliffdale standard in analyzing whether the owner of a
ski area was responsible for the deceptive misrepresentations of an
agent operator.29 Although the court declined to hold the owner of
the ski area liable,295 it offered no additional analysis of the two con-
flicting deception standards. 96
The heightened level of deference accorded federal interpreta-
tions by Vermont courts was also evident in a 1979 unfair trade
practice case. In Christie v. Dalmig, Inc.,297 the Vermont Attorney
General had promulgated a regulation pursuant to the VCFA pro-
viding that the sale of goods or services to a consumer and the subse-
quent failure of a seller to honor express and implied warranties with
respect to such goods or services constituted an unfair and deceptive
trade practice under the Little FTC Act.298 The complainant argued
that the rule was stricter than a comparable regulation adopted by
the Federal Trade Commission based on its unfairness doctrine, and
therefore, the attorney general's rule was an illegal restriction on
trade and commerce.299 The Christie court reviewed the determina-
tive factors of the federal unfairness standard and held that the state
attorney general's regulation was overly broad and invalid.300 This
severe limitation of rule making power under the VCFA suggests
extreme deference to federal decisions regarding unfair and decep-
tive trade practices. Given that the Vermont Supreme Court has al-
ready recognized the Cliffdale standard, it is very likely that this
290. 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
291. Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Vt. at -, 513 A.2d at 1171.
292. Id. at - , 513 A.2d at 1172. The court also noted in Poulin that intent to deceive
is not required to bring a deception action under the VCFA. Id. at -. , 513 A.2d at 1172-73.
293. 149 Vt. 594, 547 A.2d 1333 (1988).
294. Id. at -' 547 A.2d at 1335.
295. Id. at -. 547 A.2d at 1334-35.
296. The Stedman court also held that omissions of material fact are deceptive under
the state statute. Id. at - , 547 A.2d at 1335.
297. 136 Vt. 597, 396 A.2d 1385 (1979).
298. Id. at 600, 396 A.2d at 1387.
299. Id. at 601, 396 A.2d at 1388.
300. Id. at 600-01, 396 A.2d at 1387-88. See also Herschenson v. Lake Champlain
Motors, Inc., 139 Vt. 219, 424 A.2d 1075 (1981) (vacating an award that had been based on
the Attorney General regulation struck down in the Christie case).
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standard will eventually be formally adopted in a subsequent decep-
tion case.
2. Optional Guidance.-The Consumer Protection Acts of
New Hampshire s°0 and Arizona 0 provide that state courts "may be
guided by" the interpretations given FTCA section 5 by the federal
courts and the Federal Trade Commission. One New Hampshire
court judicially recognized the federal deference provision contained
in the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (NHCPA). a°3
There have been no cases brought under the NHCPA, however, that
specifically addressed the issue of how deception should be defined
under the Act. Consequently, it is uncertain whether New Hamp-
shire will adopt the Cliffdale deception standard.
The State of Arizona established a strong public policy position
regarding the protection of consumers against deceptive trade prac-
tices. 304 In addition to the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (ACFA),3 0 5
Arizona enacted an unfair sales act and a fraudulent advertising
act. 06 Courts recognized the remedial nature of the ACFA and
stated that the Act is to be broadly applied in order to protect con-
sumers.30 7 Under the ACFA, a private right of action has been judi-
cially inferred, despite a lack of express language in the statute con-
ferring such a right.308 In private actions the consumer must
establish that there was reliance or actual deception and that an in-
jury or damage was sustained."0 9 A comparable action brought on
301. "It is the intent of the legislature that in any action or prosecution under this [stat-
ute], the courts may be guided by the interpretation and the construction given section 5(a)(l )
of the Federal Trade Commission Act .. . by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:13 (1984 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
302. "It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing the provisions of [this statute],
that the courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the federal trade commission and
the federal courts to §§ 45, 52 and 55(a)(1) tit. 5, U.S.C.A. of the . . . the federal trade
commission act." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(B) (1987) (emphasis added).
303. New Hampshire Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 620 F. Supp.
1150, 1157 (D.N.H. 1985).
304. See Dollar A Day Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 22
Ariz. App. 270, -, 526 P.2d 1068, 1073 (1974).
305. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to 44-1534 (1987).
306. The act concerning fraudulent advertising appears at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1481 (1987). The unfair sales act has been repealed.
307. State ex rel. Corbin v. United Energy Corp. of Am., 151 Ariz. 45, 725 P.2d 752
(1986); State ex rel. Corbin v. Hovatter, 144 Ariz. 430, 698 P.2d 225 (1985); Madsen v.
Western Am. Mortgage Co., 143 Ariz. 614, 694 P.2d 1228 (1985); People ex rel. Babbitt v.
Green Acres Trust, 127 Ariz. 160, 618 P.2d 1086 (1980). In 1981 an amendment to the
ACFA brought securities violations within the purview of the statute. See State ex rel. Corbin
v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 587, 667 P.2d 1304 (1983).
308. Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521 P.2d 1119,
1121-22 (1974).
309. Id. at 576, 521 P.2d at 1122. See also Peery v. Hansen, 120 Ariz. 266, 585 P.2d
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behalf of the state by the attorney general does not require a similar
showing.310 Also, it is not necessary to establish specific intent to
deceive in order to formulate a deceptive trade practice action. 311
Arizona courts consistently noted the obligation to review fed-
eral precedent based on the ACFA's federal deference provision.31
The deference provision has been viewed as complementing the
strong public policy toward consumer protection and as effectuating
the purpose of the ACFA "to provide a remedy for injured consum-
ers who need such protection to counteract the disproportionate bar-
gaining power which is typically present in consumer transac-
tions." '3 As further indication of this public policy commitment,
Arizona courts sanctioned the awarding of punitive damages under
the statute and ruled that consumer plaintiffs may prove their claims
by a preponderance of evidence (versus a demonstration of clear and
convincing evidence).3
The federal tendency or capacity to deceive standard has been
adopted in Arizona through case law, and courts noted that interpre-
tations of the federal statute should be used in determining what
constitutes consumer fraud under the ACFA. Moreover, Arizona
adopted the traditional federal deception standard in a post-Cliffdale
case. In Madsen v. Western American Mortgage Co.,315 the court
stated that the tendency or capacity to deceive standard encom-
passed representations that "convey misleading impressions to con-
sumers even though interpretations that would not be misleading
also are possible." 316 The court further noted that despite technical
correctness, a representation would still be ruled deceptive if it had
the capacity to mislead.31 7
In the Madsen case, the court also concluded that in evaluating
574 (1978).
310. Babbitt v. Green Acres Trust, 127 Ariz. 160, - , 618 P.2d 1086, 1094 (1980).
311. State ex rel. Babbitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 128 Ariz. 483, - , 626
P.2d 1115, 1118 (1981).
312. State ex rel. Corbin v. United Energy Corp. of Am., 151 Ariz. 45, - , 725 P.2d
752, 756 (1986); Madsen v. Western Am. Mortgage Co., 143 Ariz. 614, -, 694 P.2d 1228,
1232 (1985); Nataros v. Fine Arts Gallery of Scottsdale, Inc., 126 Ariz. 44, 612 P.2d 500
(1980), and supra notes 248-49.
313. Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, - , 666 P.2d 83, 89
(1983).
314. Id. at - , 666 P.2d at 87-88.
315. 143 Ariz. 614, 694 P.2d 1228 (1985).
316. Id. at ___, 694 P.2d at 1232. Arizona courts have also adopted the Federal Trade
Commission's "substantial numbers" test. See People ex rel. Babbitt v. Green Acres Trust,
127 Ariz. 160, -, 618 P.2d 1086, 1093 (1980).
317. Id. The court also held that misrepresentations or deceptive practices that are cor-
rected before the consumer agrees to a contract will not be found to be deceptive under the
ACFA. Id.
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representations to determine deception, the federal "least sophisti-
cated reader" test should be used.31 8 Subsequent cases elaborated on
the adoption of the traditional federal deception standard, and incor-
porated the general rule that materal omissions in advertisements or
representations are deceptive under the ACFA. 19 Based on this
strong post-Cliffdale case law support of the traditional deception
standard, it is unlikely that Arizona will adopt the "likely to mis-
lead" approach.
3. Guidance to the Extent Possible.-The Consumer Protec-
tion Acts of New Mexico" ' and Texas 321 provide that state courts
should be "guided to the extent possible" by federal interpretations
of the FTCA in deciding what constitutes a deceptive trade practice.
Courts held that the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (NMUPA)
has a broad-based application.322 Although the statute contains a
federal deference provision, it also includes an inexhaustive list of
practices that are unfair or deceptive under the NMUPA. 23 This
particular provision specifies that a representation is deceptive if it is
"knowingly made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of
goods or services in the extention of credit or in the collection of
debts by any person in the regular course of his trade or commerce,
which may, tends to or does deceive or mislead any person."'24 Ac-
cordingly, the traditional tendency to deceive deception standard has
been codified in the New Mexico statute.
In Richardson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Johnson,325 a post-Cliffdale
case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that state courts may
not disregard those deceptive trade practices specifically defined
318. Id. However, deceptive acts or practices must have been performed willfully before
civil penalties can be imposed. See State ex rel. Corbin v. United Energy Corp. of Am., 151
Ariz. 45, -, 725 P.2d 752, 758 (1986).
319. See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v. Goodrich, 151 Ariz. 118, 726 P.2d 215 (1.986);
Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., Inc., 147 Ariz. 100, 708 P.2d 781 (1985). See also State
ex rel. Corbin v. United Energy Corp. of Am., 151 Ariz. 45, -, 725 P.2d 752, 756 (1986)
(The Federal Trade Commission Act should be used in determining what constitutes consumer
fraud.).
320. "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing [this statute] of the Unfair
Practices Act the courts to the extent possible will be guided by the interpretations given by
the federal trade commission and the federal courts." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-4 (1987)
(emphasis added).
321. "it is the intent of the legislature that in construing [this statute] the courts to the
extent possible will be guided by ... the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and federal courts to section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act . TEX.
Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
322. Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A., 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
323. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2C (1987).
324. Id. § 57-12-2C(14).
325. 100 N.M. 779, 676 P.2d 1344 (1984).
LITTLE FTC ACTS
under the NMUPA in favor of a federal interpretation based upon
the statute's deference provision.3"6 The court held that the "statute
is to be read and given effect as written," and that if the court abro-
gated its responsibility in this regard it "would not be giving effect to
the legislative definitions." '27 The Richardson court further stated
that since the NMUPA did not address the issue of intention to
deceive, it would be appropriate for New Mexico to adopt the aspect
of the federal law that does not require such intent."' 8 In concluding
that a deceptive trade practice had been committed, the court specif-
ically noted the statute's allowance for a finding of deception when
the omission of a material fact tends to deceive the customer.3 29
The substance of the New Mexico Court of Appeals' ruling was
impliedly upheld in a subsequent deception case. In Ashlock v. Sun-
west Bank of Roswell, N.A.,3 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that four elements must be established in order to invoke the
NMUPA:
First, the complaining party must show that the party charged
made an "oral or written statement, visual description or other
representation" that was either false or misleading. Second, the
false or misleading representation must have been "knowingly
made in the connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of
goods or services in the extention of credit or . . collection of
debts." Third, the conduct complained of must have occurred in
the regular course of the representers trade or commerce. And,
fourth, the representation must have been of the type that "may
tends to or does deceive or mislead any person.
331
Given that Ashlock constitutes an affirmation of the Richardson
holding, New Mexico has firmly established the tendency to deceive
deception standard in post-Cliffdale cases. Therefore, it is unlikely
that New Mexico will adopt a change in deception standards.
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
326. Id. at __, 676 P.2d at 1347.
327. Id. at __, 676 P.2d at 1347. See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price,
101 N.M. 438, -, 684 P.2d 524, 533 (1984) ("A party claiming a violation of the Unfair
Practices Act must rely on one or more of the specific violations enumerated in the Act and
when the trial court is going to rule and deny relief, present that specific violation to the trial
court.").
328. Richardson at _ , 676 P.2d at 1347. See also Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Ros-
well, N.A., 107 N.M. 100, -, 753 P.2d 346, 347-48 (1988).
329. Richardson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 100 N.M. 779, -_, 676 P.2d 1344, 1347-
48 (1984). Nondisclosures must, however, be made knowingly. Id.
330. 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
331. Id. at __, 753 P.2d at 347 (emphasis added).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1990
(TDTPA)332 includes a liberal statutory construction 333 provision
and a detailed listing of deceptive trade practices a.3 4 Beginning with
the early deception cases litigated under the TDTPA, Texas courts
acknowledged the legislature's intent that courts rely on the interpre-
tations of the FTC and federal courts.33 5 The tendency to deceive
standard was first recognized in 1972 in Wesware, Inc. v. State,38
and has been upheld consistently in a series of post-Cliffdale
cases.3 37 In an effort to maintain the basic purpose of the act, state
courts adopted various aspects of the traditional deception standard
including the rule that intention to deceive is not required in order to
establish a cause of action.338 More importantly, Texas impliedly re-
jected the Cliffdale standard by holding that a practice is deceptive
if it "has a tendency to deceive the ignorant, the unthinking, and the
credulous who do not stop to analyze but are governed by appear-
ances and general impressions. "'a 9 Courts recognized this test in
332. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01-.826 (Vernon 1987).
333. Id. § 17.44.
334. Id. § 17.46.
335. Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Wesware, Inc.
v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). See also Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile
Co. v. Johnson, 624 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App. 1981). The court stated that "the basic purpose of
this Act, as shown by the legislative intent, was to guarantee to the consumer the greatest
possible knowledge about any potential undesirable features of a product. Texas courts have
followed the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts in applying the Act." Id. at 240-41.
336. 488 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Regarding the court's obligation to defer
to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts, the majority stated:
The similarily of [the TDPTA] to section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act is obvious. It is the intent of the Legislature ... to rely on the vast body
of law heretofore promulgated by the federal courts and the FTC by providing
that existing interpretation by these entities shall be used "to the extent possi-
ble" in construing [the statute].
Id. at 848.
337. Barnhouse Motors, Inc. v. Godfrey, 577 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979);
Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc.
v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Myers v. Ginsberg, 735 S.W.2d 600
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Nagy v. First Nat'l Gun Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
338. Hyder-Ingram Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kutach, 612 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981); Wagner v. Morris, 658 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Ybarra v. Saldana, 624
S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). Nondisclosure of a material fact is also deceptive
under the TDTPA. See Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502
(Tex. 1982); First City Mortgage Co. v. Gillis, 694 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985);
Gibbs v. Main Bank of Houston, 666 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
339. Nagy v. First Nat'l Gun Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). See also Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982) (The court rejected a contention that a jury instruction was in error because it did
not include a statement "that the person misled must be an ordinary person though ignorant,
unthinking or credulous.") (emphasis added); Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile Co. v. Johnson,
624 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143, 145
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982).
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both pre- and post-Cliffdale cases indicating that Texas is unlikely to
accept the new deception standard.
D. Consistency with Federal Policies and Interpretations
The consumer statutes of Georgia,3 '0 Tennessee,4 1 and Utah
42
provide that deceptive trade practices will be regulated in a manner
"consistent" with the policies and interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts. The Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) codified the liberal construction require-
ment, 343 and provides a detailed listing of deceptive trade prac-
tices.344 This detailed listing does not include any specific mention of
the "tendency or capacity" to deceive standard, and there have been
no reported deception cases litigated under the TCPA. As a result, it
is uncertain whether Tennessee will adopt the new deception
standard.
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act of 1977 (UCPA), like
the Tennessee statute, codifies the liberal construction require-
ment, 345 and provides a listing of deceptive trade practices without
codifying the tendency to deceive standard.3 46 Utah also has no case
law indicating the appropriate burden of proof to be used in evaluat-
ing questionable trade practices under the statute. The UCPA does,
however, require proof of intention to deceive and actual loss for a
complainant to recover in a consumer private action case.347 Even
though these two requirements distinguish the Utah statute from
most other consumer protection acts, the absence of case law makes
it impossible to gauge the impact on state enforcement policy. Con-
sequently, whether Utah will follow the Cliffdale deception standard
remains an open question.
340. "It is the intent of the General Assembly that this [statute] be interpreted and
construed consistently with interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission in the fed-
eral courts pursuant to Section 5(a)(I) of the Federal Trade Commission Act .... " GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-391(b) (1981 & Supp. 1987) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 106-
1201(b) (1984 & Supp. 1989)) (emphasis added).
341. "It is the intent of the general assembly that this [statute] shall be interpreted and
construed consistently with the interpretations given by the federal trade commission and the
federal courts pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ....
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-115 (1984 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
342. "This Act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: . .. (4) to
make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the policies of the
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-
2(4) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
343. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-102 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
344. Id. § 47-18-104.
345. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
346. Id. § 13-11-4.
347. Id. § 13-11-4(2).
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The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act of 1975 (GBPA) also
mandates a liberal construction, 4 8 and includes a separate list of
representative unfair and deceptive trade practices. 34 9 Despite these
similarities with the Tennessee and Utah consumer protection stat-
utes, Georgia courts deferred to federal policy to resolve specific
trade practice questions. In some instances, those courts imposed
more rigorous requirements on consumer plaintiffs than have been
encountered in any other federal deference state.
In Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine, Inc.,350 the buyer of a mo-
tor home sought to rescind a purchase contract, and appealed when
summary judgment was entered against him.351 Relying on the inter-
pretation of an FTC regulation governing the assignation of model
years to motor vehicles, the court held that the manufacturer had
not violated the GBPA.a52 An initial evaluation of this strict adher-
ence to federal enforcement policy would seem to indicate that Geor-
gia courts are inclined to take a pro-consumer position in deceptive
trade practice cases. This analysis would conform with the early rec-
ognition by Georgia courts that injured consumers have "an indepen-
dent right to recover under the act, regardless of any other theory of
recovery. 31 53  Georgia consumers, however, are also subject to two
requirements that are unique to the enforcement of the GBPA and
which are at variance with federal deception enforcement policy.
Although many of the consumer protection statutes with federal
deference allowances include a "public interest" requirement, 5 4 the
Georgia judiciary mandated that the questioned deceptive trade
practice must have taken place "within the context of the consumer
market place. 3 5 The two factors to be reviewed in deciding whether
this requirement has been met are: (1) "the medium through which
the act or practice is introduced into the stream of commerce;"' 56
and (2) "the market on which the act or practice is reasonably in-
348. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-391(a) (1981 & Supp. 1987) (current version at GA. CODE
ANN. § 106-1201 (1984 & 1989 Supp.)).
349. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (current version at GA. CODE
ANN. § 106-1203 (1984 & Supp. 1989)).
350. 169 Ga. App. 461, 313 S.E.2d 156 (1984).
351. Id. at 461, 313 S.E.2d at 157.
352. Id. at 461-62, 313 S.E.2d at 157.
353. Attaway v. Tom's Auto Sales, 144 Ga. App. 813, 815, 242 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1978).
354. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
355. State v. Meredith Chevrolet, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 8, 11-12, 244 S.E.2d 15, 18
(1978). See also Larson v. Tandy Corp., 187 Ga. App. 893, 896, 371 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1988);
Burdakin v. Hub Motor Co., 183 Ga. App. 90, 357 S.E.2d 839 (1987); Gross v. Ideal Pool
Corp., 181 Ga. App. 483, 484, 352 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1987); DeLouch v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
147 Ga. App. 124, 248 S.E.2d 193 (1978).
356. State v. Meredith Chevrolet, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 8, 12, 244 S.E.2d 15, 18 (1978).
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tended to impact. 35 7 By having to show a marketplace effect, Geor-
gia consumers are held to a more restrictive public interest require-
ment than in any other federal deference state. 358
A second, and even more significant, deviation from federal de-
ception enforcement policy involves the due diligence defense availa-
ble to defendants in actions filed under the GBPA. In Zeeman v.
Black,359 the court held that the sale of a home was not in the con-
duct of business and therefore constituted a private action having no
impact on the public interest.360 The case involved an alleged misrep-
resentation, upon which the court relied to impose a significant bur-
den on deceptive trade practice plaintiffs:
[A] claimant who alleges the FBPA was violated as the result of
a misrepresentation must demonstrate that he was injured as the
result of the reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation. There-
fore, . . . when the alleged violation of the FBPA is a misrepre-
sentation, the claimant is not entitled to recover if he had an
equal and ample opportunity to ascertain the truth but failed to
exercise proper diligence to do so."'
Even though Georgia courts have not specifically addressed the ap-
propriate deception standard to be followed under the GBPA, the
due diligence defense recognized in the Zeeman case indicates that
the Georgia statute is not construed as liberally to benefit consumers
as is the case in most other states. Given that the due diligence re-
quirement has been upheld in subsequent cases, and that Georgia
courts have exhibited a strong propensity to follow federal policy, it
is likely that Georgia will adopt the Cliffdale deception standard.
IV. Judicial Deference States
The Little FTC Acts of Louisiana, 62 North Carolina,' 63 and
357. Id. at - , 244 S.E.2d at 18.
358. See cases cited supra note 287.
359. 156 Ga. App. 82, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980). Cf. Waller v. Scheen, 175 Ga. App. 1,
332 S.E.2d 293 (1985).
360. Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 85-86, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1980).
361. Zeeman, 156 Ga. App. at 87, 273 S.E.2d at 916. Accord Nims v. Otter, 188 Ga.
App. 516, 373 S.E.2d 396 (1988); Delta Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wells, 187 Ga. App. 694, 371
S.E.2d 250 (1988); Heidt v. Potamkin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 903, 354 S.E.2d
440 (1987). The Zeeman court adopted the due diligence requirement despite acknowledging
*the role of the federal act in deciding cases under the GBPA: "[N]ot only is the FBPA itself
couched in terms of protecting the public interest, the comparable federal law, the Federal
Trade Commission Act, . . . is expressly made the appropriate standard by which the purpose
and intent of the Georgia Act is to be effectuated, implemented and construed." Zeeman, 156
Ga. App. at -, 273 S.E.2d at 913.
362. Louisiana Unfair Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
51:1401-1418 (West 1987).
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Pennsylvania3 6 4 do not contain explicit federal deference provisions.
State courts in each of these jurisdictions, however, have judicially
recognized the appropriateness of referring to federal interpretations
when deciding deception cases. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Law (LUTPL) includes proscriptive
language that closely tracks the FTCA. s65 In Guste v. Demars,66 the
first case filed under the LUTPL, the court recognized the close con-
nection between the state and federal statutes. In a benchmark rul-
ing, the court expressed the opinion that state courts "may and
should consider interpretations of the federal courts and of the Com-
mission relative to such similar statutes to adjudge the scope and
application of our own statute." '367
Subsequent to the Guste judicial deference acknowledgement, a
series of consumer protection cases arose in which the Louisiana
courts recognized this mandate. 368 Although there are no reported
deceptive trade practice cases under the LUTPL, Louisiana courts
have deferred to federal standards in both antitrust 6 9 and unfair
trade practice cases. 370 In both situations, the courts utilized the op-
portunity to incorporate federal antitrust and unfair trade practice
policies as the appropriate governing standards under the LUTPL.
In the most recent case the deference procedure received per-
haps its strongest endorsement when a Louisiana appellate court
stated that: "Louisiana courts give great deference to determinations
363. North Carolina Consumer Protection Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to 75-35
(1988).
364. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to 201-92 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
365. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405A (West 1987).
366. 330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
367. Id. at 125. See also First Fin. Bank, FSB v. Butler, 492 So. 2d 503 (La. Ct. App.
1986).
368. Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 839 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir.
1988); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1008 (5th Cir.
1981); Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 528 So. 2d 198, 202 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1988); First Fin. Bank, FSB
v. Butler, 492 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Huey T. Littleton Claims Serv., Inc. v.
McGuffee, 497 So. 2d 790, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Morris v. Rental Tools, Inc., 435 So. 2d
528, 533 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Gour v. Daray Motor Co., Inc., 373 So. 2d 571, 577-78 (La. Ct.
App. 1979).
369. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.
1981).
370. Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 577 F. Supp.
1466, 1469 (M.D. La. 1984); Gautreau v. Southern Milk Sales, Inc., 509 So. 2d 495, 497 (La.
Ct. App. 1987); Crown Buick, Inc. v. Bercier, 483 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Dufau v. Creole Eng'g, Inc., 465 So. 2d 752, 758 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Roustabouts, Inc. v.
Hamer, 447 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Coffey v. People's Mortgage & Loan of
Shreveport, Inc., 408 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Moore v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d 630, 634 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
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of unfair trade practices by the Federal Trade Commission. '"871
Based on the strong history of judicial deference as applied to anti-
trust and unfair trade practice litigation, it appears likely that Loui-
siana will adopt the Cliffdale deception standard in an appropriate
case.
The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Pro-
tection Law (PUTPL) 372 was enacted in 1968. Although the statute
does not include a federal deference provision, it does provide a de-
tailed listing of prohibited deceptive and unfair trade practices, 73
including a catch-all provision that proscribes "any other fraudulent
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstand-
ing." 74 In one of the first cases litigated under the PUTPL, the
court held that courts "may look to the decisions under the [FTCA]
for guidance and interpretation. 3 175 Following that decision, a series
of cases were litigated in the 1970s in which many aspects of the
federal deception standard were adopted including: good faith is not
a defense in a deception case; 376 intention to deceive is not required
to establish a deception cause of action;377 a representation that is
literally and technically correct may still be deceptive if it is a par-
tial truth;378 and actual deception is not required in cases filed under
the state statute. 7 1 Pennsylvania courts have also consistently recog-
nized that the Little FTC Act is to be broadly construed and flexible
in order to prevent easy evasion.38
371. State v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 528 So. 2d 198, 202 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(emphasis added).
372. The current version of the Pennsylvania law appears at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§
201-1 to 201-9.2 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
373. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
374. Id. § 201-2(4).
375. Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Indus., Inc., 4 Pa. Commw. 1, 21 (1972).
376. Commonwealth v. Foster, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 203 (1972).
377. Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 19 Mercer Co. L.J.
382, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 115 (1983).
378. Commonwealth v. Foster, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 203, 207-08 (1972). Pennsylvania
courts have also held that the nondisclosure of a material fact is also deceptive under the
PUTPL. See Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 121 Pa. Commw.
642, 647, 551 A.2d 602, 604 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Luther Ford Sales, Inc., 60 Pa.
Commw. 123, 430 A.2d 1053 (1981).
379. See Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 19 Mercer Co. L.J. 382, 26 Pa.
D. & C.3d 115 (1983).
380. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 459, 329 A.2d 812,
817 (1974); Wright v. North American Life Assurance Co., 372 Pa. Super. 272, 280, 539
A.2d 434, 438 (1988); Gabriel v. O'Hara, 368 Pa. Super. 383, 389, 534 A.2d 488, 491 (1987);
Culbreth v. Lawrence J. Miller, Inc., 328 Pa. Super. 374, 382, 477 A.2d 491, 495 (1984);
Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 121 Pa. Commw. 642, 647, 551
A.2d 602, 604 (1988); Chatham Racquet Club v. Commonwealth, 116 Pa. Commw. 55, 541
A.2d 51, 53 (1988); Commonwealth v. National Apartment Leasing Co., 102 Pa. Commw.
623, 627, 519 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1986).
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This strong judicial deference caseline culminated in a 1983 de-
cision, Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 81 in which the
court expressly adopted the federal tendency or capacity to deceive
standard. 82 Since subsequent post-Cliffdale cases continued to ac-
knowledge the need to liberally construe the PUTPL, and have not
mentioned the reasonable consumer standard, it is unlikely that
Pennsylvania will adopt the new deception standard.
In North Carolina, courts held that federal interpretations may
be followed in deciding cases under the North Carolina Consumer
Protection Act (NCCPA). a83 Consequently, courts ruled that under
the NCCPA knowledge of falsity,384 lack of intent, a85 and good
faiths88 are not adequate defenses in deception cases. Courts also
held that actual deception is not a prerequisite to establishing a
cause of action under the Little FTC Act.387 The adoption of signifi-
cant parts of the federal deception standard culminated with judicial
acknowledgement that a practice would be considered deceptive
under the NCCPA if it had a tendency or capacity to deceive an
average consumer. 888
The traditional federal deception standard was first recognized
in a 1980 case. 89 The case involved a plaintiff who filed suit to re-
cover damages arising out of the unsuccessful effort to develop a
381. 19 Mercer Co. L.J. 382, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 115 (1983).
382. Id. at 385, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 120. The Zimmerman court also adopted the
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shopping center; the defendant insurance company tendered and
then terminated a loan commitment. 890 The plaintiff argued that this
practice was unfair and deceptive since it had a tendency or capacity
to deceive.3 9'
Despite a strong series of North Carolina cases upholding the
traditional deception standard, the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co.8 92 that federal
court decisions "are not controlling in construing the North Carolina
Act." ' The court noted that the NCCPA, unlike other state trade
regulation statutes, "does not require a direct reference to the FTC
Act for its interpretation." "4 Although the Edmisten case could pro-
vide the basis for adoption of the Cliffdale deception standard, the
series of cases decided during the last few years will likely foreclose
the adoption of the new standard. These recent cases reaffirmed the
tendency to deceive standard as the appropriate governing guideline
under the NCCPA, and did not equate an average consumer with




The change in federal deception standards brought about by the
Cliffdale case is unfortunate for consumers. This ruling set the tone
for regulatory policy regarding deceptive trade practices at both the
federal and state levels. There seems to be little tangible evidence,
however, that state courts are moving in the direction of adopting
the new deception standard. At the present time, only five states ap-
pear inclined to adopt the Cliffdale holding, and only Vermont has
openly endorsed the new standard in a post-Cliffdale case.
Another development directly linked to the Federal Trade Com-
mission's less than vigorous enforcement of questionable trade activ-
ity is the increased activism of state attorneys general nationwide.
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Due to the decline of the FTC and other federal agencies as active
regulators of business activities, the National Association of Attor-
neys General (NAAG) has proposed that states adopt stricter rules
and regulations regarding certain types of advertising."' 6 Advertisers
have consistently argued that state attorneys general should not have
the right to regulate national advertising since only the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to do so and can also insure a uniform
enforcement policy.
Recently, the Department of Transportation (DOT), pursuant
to authority granted by the Federal Aviation Act, threatened to in-
validate state efforts to regulate certain types of air fare advertising
by airlines . 97 The Act gives the Department of Transportation au-
thority to regulate unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition.3 98 Prior to its demise, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) promulgated a rule that required that the entire price of a
tour package be prominently displayed so that consumers would not
be deceived about total cost. " The airlines had undertaken to fea-
ture only partial prices in the advertisement, which included percent-
age add ons in small print. Following the transfer of airline regula-
tory power from the CAB to the Department of Transportation, the
DOT issued several orders that allowed airlines to unbundle various
surcharges such as an international departure tax, and to state the
cost of these charges elsewhere in the advertisement. °°
On December 12, 1987, the National Association of Attorneys
General adopted advertising guidelines that stated that this type of
surcharge breakdown for air travel would be considered deceptive
under state Little FTC Acts. 0 1 Airlines were subsequently informed
by several states that these guidelines would be enforced, and in re-
sponse, the DOT informed the states that "the federal government
has preempted this aspect of state advertising regulation," and "if
threats to enforce the particular sections of the guidelines continue,
we will be forced to consider taking formal legal action to prevent
their enforcement.' 0 2 The states filed suit against the DOT, charg-
ing that the orders were issued in violation of proper notice and com-
ment procedures, while the DOT argued that the states lacked
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standing to bring the action. 40 3 In a major setback for advertising
groups, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the states as to both issues.40 4
This case will almost certainly have profound consequences for
the FTC's policy regarding regulation of deceptive trade practices.
The federal courts do not appear to share the view that it is abso-
lutely essential that national advertising policy be maintained uni-
formly by federal agencies. Had the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals ruled differently, the impact would have been dramatic rela-
tive to the continued viability of federal deference provisions con-
tained within state Little FTC Acts. In effect, if the states can be
prohibited from regulating advertising that is national in scope, the
question of whether state courts should follow interpretations ren-
dered by the FTC and federal courts is moot. Although former
Chairman Miller would undoubtedly endorse the effort to remove
such advertising from the purview of state regulation, state consum-
ers will be better served by continued resistance to the Cliffdale de-
ception standard and a vigorous application of Little FTC Acts to
questionable trade practices.
403. Id. at 441.
404. Id.
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CLASSIFICATION OF STATE FEDERAL
DEFERENCE PROVISIONS
DEFERENCE LANGUAGE
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N N 0 T N C H R





CONNECTICUT X X X
FLORIDA X X X
GEORGIA X X
IDAHO X X X
ILLINOIS X X
LOUISIANA X X
MAINE X X X
MARYLAND X X
MASSACHUSETTS X X X
MONTANA X X X
NEW HAMPSHIRE X X
NEW MEXICO X X
NORTH CAROLINA X X
OHIO X X
PENNSYLVANIA X X
RHODE ISLAND X X




VERMONT X X X
WASHINGTON X X
WEST VIRGINIA X X X
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ALASKA X X X
ARIZONA X X X X X
CONNECTICUT X X X X X
FLORIDA X
GEORGIA X
IDAHO X X X
ILLINOIS X X X X X
LOUISIANA X
MAINE X X X
MARYLAND X X X X
MASSACHUSETTS X X X
MONTANA X
NEW HAMPSHIRE X
NEW MEXICO X X X
NORTH CAROLINA X X X X
OHIO X X X X
PENNSYLVANIA X X X X
RHODE ISLAND X
SOUTH CAROLINA X X X X
TENNESSEE X
TEXAS X X X X
UTAH X
VERMONT X X X
WASHINGTON X X X X
WEST VIRGINIA X X
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